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CHALLENGING THE TELCO-CABLE CROSS-
OWNERSHIP BAN: FIRST AMENDMENT
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
INTERACTIVE INFORMATION HIGHWAY
As the network spreads, it is fostering both the universality
and the individuality of human discourse. The Net itself, the
world's fastest-spreading'communications medium, is the tele-
phone network in its most liberating, unruly, and fertile new
guise.
Thus Bell's baby is freeing our understanding of the possibili-
ties that lie in ancient words: neighborhood and meeting and
information and news. It is global; it is democratic; it is the cen-
tral agent of change in our sense of community. It is how, and
why, we are wired. -James Gleick (author of Chaos') in Wired2
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I. Introduction
The future development of the information highway hinges on
regulatory and judicial decisions made today. This Note explores
options available to decisionmakers by analyzing Chesapeake &
Potomac Telephone Co. v. United States (C & P),3 which set an im-
portant precedent regarding a telephone company's First Amend-
ment right to provide video programming over its own facilities in
its local service area. This precedent has motivated telephone com-
panies (telcos) across the country to emulate the Chesapeake &
Potomac Telephone Company (C & P) by bringing similar suits.
As a result, federal courts in California, 4 Maine, 5 Illinois,6 Michi-
gan7 and Washington8 are trying cases modeled on C & P.
3. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909
(E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985 (4th Cir. Nov. 21, 1994) (C & P).
The National Cable Television Association also participated as an intervenor.
4. GTE California, Inc. v. FCC, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 30324 (9th Cir. Oct. 31,
1994) (dismissing as moot a constitutional challenge to § 533(b)). Pacific Telesis
Group, Pacific Bell and Nevada Bell intervened in this case.
5. Nynex Corp. v. FCC, 153 F.R.D. 1 (D. Me. 1994). As of December 7, 1994,
the court had decided only that the New England Cable Television Association,
(NECTA), a regional six-state association representing most cable operators in New
England, would be permitted to intervene. Id. at 3.
6. Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15512 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
27, 1994) (holding § 533(b) to be an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of speech).
7. Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15512 (N.D. I11. Oct.
27, 1994) See supra note 6. This consolidated case included as plaintiffs the Amer-
itech Corporation, Illinois Bell Telephone Company and Michigan Bell Telephone
Company. Michigan Bell Telephone Company's suit, brought originally in the East-
ern District of Michigan, was transferred on June 14, 1994, by United States District
Judge Duggan to the Northern District of Illinois. (N.D. Ill. No. 94 C 4089).
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C & P, a Bell Atlantic Corporation subsidiary providing local
telephone service in Northern Virginia, claimed that the cable-telco
cross-ownership ban, codified at § 533(b)9 of the Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 1984,10 infringes unconstitutionally upon its
First Amendment right to freedom of expression. The Department
of Justice (DOJ), joined by intervenor National Cable Television
Association (NCTA), is defending the statute.
Section 533(b) contains two subsections that prohibit telcos,
which are considered to be common carriers, from providing video
programming within their local service areas. Specifically,
§ 533(b)(1) prohibits telcos from providing video programming
over their own lines or through a subsidiary,1 and § 533(b)(2) pro-
hibits telcos from carrying the video programming of affiliates.' 2
Section 533(b) is also called a "cross-ownership ban" because it
prohibits telcos from "crossing" over into ownership of video pro-
gramming companies in their local service areas.
On November 21, 1994, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit upheld the Eastern District Court of Virginia's decision that
§ 533(b) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it
is not narrowly tailored. 13 As a result of its holding, the district
8. US West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wa. 1994). The Wash-
ington district court followed the C & P district court's arguments, finding application
of 533(b) to US West to be unconstitutional under the intermediate test of the First
Amendment. Id. at 1191. (See infra parts III.A. and III.B. for discussion of how the
intermediate test is selected and applied.) The Washington case, however, omitted
many of the detailed arguments featured in the C & P decisions.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1984). For a full discussion of § 533(b), the cross-owner-
ship ban, see infra notes 38-58 and accompanying text.
10. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-557 (1984).
11. Section 533(b)(1) states:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in whole or in part to
subchapter II of [the Communications Act], to provide video programming
directly to subscribers in its telephone service area, either directly or indi-
rectly through an affiliate owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under
common control with the common carrier. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)(1) (1984).
12. Section 533(b)(2) states:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in whole or in part to
subchapter II of [the Communications Act], to provide channels of commu-
nications or pole line conduit space, or other rental arrangements, to any
entity which is directly or indirectly owned by, operated by, controlled by, or
under common control with such common carrier, if such facilities or ar-
rangements are to be used for, or in connection with, the provision of video
programming directly to subscribers in the telephone service area of the
common carrier. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)(2) (1984).
13. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *66-67 (citations omitted), and C & P,
830 F. Supp. at 931-32 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). See infra
part III for a full explanation of the First Amendment aspects of the courts' holdings.
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court enjoined the federal government from applying § 533(b) to
prohibit C & P from transmitting over its own lines its own video
programming.' 4
This Note argues that these courts should have found § 533(b) to
be narrowly tailored because the statute is a reasonable method for
Congress to address a significant problem: anticompetitive behav-
ior in the telecommunications industry. To support this conclusion,
this Note explores the antitrust concerns underlying the cross-own-
ership ban. Before reaching this antitrust analysis, however, Part II
summarizes the background of the C & P case by discussing the
significance of an interactive information highway, reviewing the
regulatory history of the telecommunications industry and report-
ing the facts specific to C & P. Part III traces the •C & P courts'
First Amendment conclusion that § 533(b), the cross-ownership
ban, is not narrowly tailored. Part IV, the primary focus of this
Note, analyzes potential anticompetitive behavior by telcos in the
noninteractive and interactive video programming transmission
markets, according to the antitrust doctrine of essential facilities.
Part V presents three recommendations: (i) emphasize the role of
interactivity in making judicial and legislative decisions about the
information highway, (ii) in C & P and Other similar cases, courts
should defer to Congress, especially considering the complexity of
the facts pertinent to telecommunications reform, and (iii) to regu-
late the structure 'of'telecommunications companies, apply the gen-
erally-applicable antitrust laws, which are less vulnerable to First
Amendment challenges than industry-specific legislation, such as
§ 533(b).
II. Background
A. The Public Interest in an Interactive Information Highway
This Note is admittedly biased in favor of a fully interactive in-
formation highway, which will best serve the public interest. Ex-
change of ideas is necessary to assist people in interpreting their
world, and adapting to it. John Stuart Mill wrote that man is "ca-
14. The district court enjoined enforcement of the statute through a limiting in-junction. At the request of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the injunction prevent-
ing enforcement of the statute was later limited to Bell Atlantic Corporations'
territories. C & P, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
32985 (4th Cir. Nov. 21, 1994), Amended Final Order, No. 92-1751-1 (Oct. 7, 1993).
Subsections 533(b)(1) and (2) remain in effect for the other Regional Bell Operating
Companies, which are therefore creating cases in their own states to challenge the
statute. See supra notes 4-8.
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pable of rectifying his mistakes by discussion and experience. Not
by experience alone. There must be discussion to show how expe-
rience is to be interpreted.""5 In addition to the personal satisfac-
tion of gaining wisdom about the world, people benefit from
discussions about how the community should be governed. Demo-
cratic government in particular relies on ongoing public debate.
Presently, the cause of public discourse is being threatened by
passive consumption of superficial broadcast and cable television
programming and news.16 Society should be concerned because, as
Justice Louis Brandeis observed in his classic statement in Whitney
v. California, "the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people;
... public discussion is a political duty; and ... this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government."' 7 .
By transforming passive television viewing into interactive on-
line debates, the :information highway could provide new fora for
Americans to engage in the public discussion that is integral to suc-
cessful democratic government. If access is provided to all citizens,
the information highway could provide a bridge for people to over-
come physical and societal divisions, such as distance, disability,
class and race.
Computer bulletin board systems (BBSs)'8 have been described
as " 'perfect for cities where' people are hungering for contact but
afraid to meet each other on the street.' "I" One BBS system oper-
ator described his BBS, called After Five, as "giv[ing] people an
opportunity to share ideas and information. There's also been a
number of good friendships formed. There's also been two couples
that got married who met on our board. It's really kind of neat. In
15. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80 (Gertrude Himmelfarb, ed., Penguin
Books 1987).
16. See Lewis M. Branscomb, Balancing the Commercial and Public-Interest Vi-
sions of the NIl, in 20/20 VISION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUcTURE 5-6 (Dep't Commerce 1994).
17. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
18. Computer bulletin board systems (BBSs) may be operated by commercial en-
terprises like America On-Line or by individuals. BBSs consist of computers con-
nected to telephone lines. Using a modem, telephone line and computer, subscribers
dial the telephone number for a BBS. Once connected, information is transferred
back and forth through the phone lines between the BBS computer and the subscrib-
ers' computers. Subscribers can then read the information housed on the BBS com-
puter, download information to their own computers, and exchange messages (often
simultaneously) with other subscribers and the BBS system operator.
19. Constance L. Hays, Touring the Cyberhood, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994, § 13, at
1 (quoting Paul Saffo, a director of the Institute for the Future in Menlo Park,
California).
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fact one gal just had a baby." 20 In general, special niches-or
"nodes" in computer parlance-on the information highway, such
as BBSs, may constitute a new form of community. They are "vir-
tual neighborhoods of the virtual city, each defined by whom you
find .... ,21 Or, maybe After Five and other BBSs are more than
"virtual" communities-after all, any place that brings people to-
gether to form a family and create a new human life seems quite
"real" indeed.
Community-building and democratic debate on the information
highway depend on interactivity. Interactivity, however, is not be-
ing built into all aspects of the information highway,22 or always
discussed during public debates about the information highway.23
For instance, while cable television provides multiple channels into
the home, most systems do not provide subscribers with the oppor-
tunity to make their own contributions to this information flow. 24
The ability of ordinary people to place their own content, such as
ideas and programming, on the information highway may be cur-
tailed by companies that control the conduits. Companies that own
the information highway infrastructure may prefer a captive audi-
ence that uses the information highway solely for entertainment
and home-shopping purposes.25 The Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion (EFF), a public interest organization involved in information
highway issues, has warned that:
None of the interactive services promised, or the diversity
hoped for, will be possible with an eight-lane data superhighway
rushing one-way into the home, and only a narrow footpath run-
ning out. . . The failures of regulation and the limits of the
technology, itself, have prevented broadcast and cable television
from becoming the promised saviors of education or political
20. Telephone interview with Tom Battler, systems operator of After Five, in Elk-
hart, Indiana, (July 1, 1992) (conducted by the author).
21. Hays, supra note 19, at § 13, at 1.
22. Lewis M. Branscomb, Director of the Program on Science, Technology, and
Public Policy of Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs,
has observed that "[i]t seems likely that the enormous consumer markets for elec-
tronic entertainment and for voice communication will dominate the modest re-
sources invested in the many networks that make up the Internet and the bulletin
boards and other innovative information services accessible through the Internet."
Branscomb, supra note 16, at 5.
23. See infra part V.A.
24. See infra part IV.A.
25. See Branscomb, supra note 16, at 9-10 (identifying "the enormous influence of
emerging commercial markets for entertainment and shopping" as a threat that may
undermine the development of public interest applications for the information
highway).
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life. We must act now to ensure that the information highway is
more than just 10,000 more channels of what we have today-
what Newton Minow might have called "a vaster wasteland."26
A noninteractive, "vaster wasteland" is undesirable because it
eviscerates the potential of the information highway. In contrast,
an interactive information highway could allow people to discover
their unique corner of the virtual world, where they could share
enthusiasm about topics as specialized as nuclear physics, Salvador
Dalf or the best choice for mayor. In general, interactive BBSs
could provide a viable alternative to the numbing-and dumbing-
effect of noninteractive television. For instance, interactive infor-
mation highway services could support "distance learning," which
enables students to study Japanese with a teacher hundreds of
miles away, and "telemedicine," which allows doctors on opposite
coasts to confer about the same x-ray.27 On a philosophical level,
interactive services could help human beings form new bonds that
will heal spirits alienated and isolated as a result of the modern
dispersion of families and communities.
B. Regulation of the Telecommunications Industry
Access to interactive telecommunications for most Americans is
likely to depend on how the telecommunications industry is regu-
lated. Regulation of the telecommunications industry has occurred
in a fairly unique manner: it has been conducted in large part by
the district court overseeing the modified final judgment decree,
commonly known as the MFJ, that broke up the American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company (AT&T).28
The MFJ heralded the end of AT&T's control over most of the
nation's telecommunications infrastructure. AT&T and its local
subsidiaries agreed in 1982 to the MFJ, which modified the terms
of a Department of Justice (DOJ) antitrust action originally
brought against AT&T in 1949.29 The MFJ split the behemoth
26. Mitchell Kapor, Building Open Platforms: Public Policy For The Information
Age, in 20/20 VISION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRA-
STRUCTURE 126 (Dep't Commerce 1994). See also Mitchell Kapor & Jerry Berman,
The NIl: A Superhighway Through the Wasteland?, EFF NETWORKS & POLICY 1.
27. For applications of information highway technology, see NATIONAL INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECHNOLOGY, PUTING THE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TO
WORK: A REPORT OF THE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE COMMITTEE
ON APPLICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY 857 (1994).
28. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom., Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), modified, 714 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988).
29. The MFJ modified an original consent decree entered in 1956, United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246. In 1974, the government alleged
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AT&T into Ma Bell and the seven Baby Bells.30 Ma Bell retained
the name "AT&T" and was allowed to operate in competitive mar-
kets, including long distance services and telephone equipment
manufacturing. The Baby Bells, also known as Regional Bell Op-
erating Companies (RBOCs), 31  retained the local service
franchises (most of which were local monopolies granted by state
and local governments) and were prohibited from entering com-
petitive markets, including long distance services and manufactur-
ing.32 Both AT&T and the RBOCs were initially barred33 from
providing information services.34
Since AT&T and the DOJ agreed to the MFJ in 1982, District
Court Judge Harold Greene has overseen changes to the decree,
and gradually reduced restrictions imposed on the RBOCs. Even
though his official position is simply federal district judge for the,
District of Columbia, Judge Green has become the de facto admin-
istrator of significant segments of the telecommunications industry
because of his power over AT&T and the RBOCs under the
in a second antitrust suit that the regional telcos gave preferential treatment to
AT&T's long distance calls, thereby disadvantaging competitors like MCI. The result
of this second antitrust suit was the MFJ. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 131.
30. For additional information concerning the evolution of the MFJ since 1982, see
infra part V.C.1.
31. The RBOCs include Ameritech Corporation, Bell Atlantic Corporation, Bell-
South Corporation, Nynex Corporation, Pacific Telesis Group, Southwestern Bell
Corporation and US West. In addition to the RBOCs, there are approximately 2,500
independent telephone companies, including GTE Corp. and United Telecom.
SONINA VELASQUEZ, DATAPRO RESEARCH, AN INTRODUCTION TO TELEPHONY 5
(1991).
32. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 231.
33. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227. The court was concerned that if AT&T were al-
lowed to provide information services, called at that time "electronic publishing," its
market power would enable it to smother the infant industry. Id. at 223-24.
34. "Information service" is defined in the decree as "the offering of a capability
for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or
making available information which may be conveyed via telecommunications, except
that such service does not include any use of any such capability for the management,
control, or operation of a telecommunications 'system or the management of a tele-
communications service." AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229. The district court has given as
examples of information services: "(1) [T]ravel information, restaurant reviews and
reservations, hotel and rental car information, and airline schedules; (2) instantaneous
access to ticketing for sports, musical, cultural, and entertainment events; (3) informa-
tion concerning meetings ... ; (4) social messaging; (5) access to... governmental
information; (6) language instruction; (7) reprints of newspaper and magazine articles;
and (8) employment services." United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 673 F. Supp.
525, 590 (D.D.C. 1987), modified, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied
sub nom., MCI Communications Corp. v. United States, 498 U.S. 911 (1990).
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MFJ.35 Judge Greene will retain this power until the MFJ is dis-
mantled or vacated,36 or telecommunications reform legislation is
passed to move oversight of the MFJ to the executive branch.37
Although Judge Greene wields considerable power, the federal
entity that is officially designated to regulate the telecommunica-
tions industry is the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
The FCC, in fact, is responsible for the regulations-§§ 533(b)(1)
and (2)-that constitute the cross-ownership ban at the heart of
the C & P case.
The cross-ownership ban stems from FCC regulations that were
intended to protect the nascent cable television industry from the
predatory practices of telcos. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
cable television, called Community Access Television (CATV),
provided wired connections to communities that could not receive
television signals through the air. Telcos were interested in ex-
panding their lines of business into this promising new industry.38
Telcos therefore had incentives to deny independent cable compa-
nies' requests for access to the infrastructure necessary for install-
ing cable.39 Regulators were particularly concerned because telcos
owned many of the poles and conduits that cable companies ex-
pected to use in laying their lines.
35. Leslie Cauley, et al., Telecom Showdown: Battle Lines Harden as Baby Bells
Fight to Kill Restrictions, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1994, at Al.
36. Four of the RBOCs (Bell Atlantic Corporation, BellSouth Corporation,
NYNEX Corporation and Southwestern Bell) brought a motion to vacate the consent
decree, arguing that the purposes of the decree had been achieved. United States v.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (No. 82-192), motion to vacate, filed July 21,
1994. See Cauley, et al., supra note 35, at Al.
37. See, e.g., H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), and S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994).
38. The Justice Department and others warned the Commission "that the tele-
phone companies ha[d] been seeking to extend their regulated telephone monopoly
into the areas of CATV and broadband coaxial cables, primarily to assure themselves
of control over the services broadband coaxial cable will perform in the future." Ap-
plications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities
Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems (final report and or-
der), 21 F.C.C.2d 307, 324 (1970), reconsidered in part, 22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970), aff'd
sub nom., General Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971)
[hereinafter 1970 Order].
39. See 1970 Order, supra note 38, at 324. "The monopoly position of the tele-
phone company in the community [results in] effective control of the pole lines (or
conduit space) required for the construction and operation of CATV systems. Hence,
the telephone company is in an effective position to preempt the market for this ser-
vice ... ." Id. See also General Tel. Co. of the S.W., 449 F.2d at 851; Common Carrier
Tariff for CATV Systems, 4 F.C.C.2d 257 (1966) (containing complaints that telcos had
been favoring their own CATV subsidiaries, and discriminating against independent
CATV providers, in leasing pole and conduit space).
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In a 1970 rule-making proceeding, the FCC found that telcos
with cable investments had the ability and incentive to discriminate
against independent CATV providers,' and therefore decided that
telcos should not be allowed to provide cable services in their local
service areas. 41 In cross-ownership regulations that are still on the
books, the FCC banned telco ownership of cable companies. 42
The FCC instituted these regulations as part of its authority to
approve telco proposals for infrastructure modification, pursuant
to § 214 of the Communications Act.43 In 1978, Congress passed
the Pole Attachments Act of 1978, which authorized the FCC to
regulate the rates, terms and conditions for attaching cable wiring
to telephone poles.44 Subsequently, Congress codified the tele-
phone-cable cross-ownership regulations at § 533(b)(1) & (2) 45 of
40. Applications of Telephone Common Carriers for Section 214 Certificates for
Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems
(Notice of Proposed Rule Making), 34 FED. REG. 6290 (1969).
41. See 1970 Order, supra note 38.
42. The rule prohibits a local telephone company from providing "video program-
ming to the viewing public in its telephone service area, either directly, or indirectly
through an affiliate owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under common control
with the telephone common carer...." 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(a) (1993). The relation is
strictly construed so that the telco may have no "financial or business relationship
whatsoever by contract or otherwise, directly or indirectly between the carrier and the
customer." 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(c) (1993). The Commission's rules also prohibit any
telco from providing "channels of communications or pole line conduit space, or other
rental arrangements" to any affiliate of itself to provide video programming to the
public. 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(b)(1993).
43. Section 214 provides in pertinent part:
No carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line or of an extension
of any line, or shall acquire or operate any line, or extension thereof, or shall
engage in transmission over or by means of such additional or extended line,
unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a
certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity re-
quire or will require the construction, or operation, or construction and op-
eration, of such additional or extended line .... 47 U.S.C. § 214(a)(1988).
44. Pub. L. No. 97-130, 95 Stat. 1687 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1982 & Supp. V
1987)).
A 1987 Supreme Court decision, FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987),
determined that the Act applies only if pole access is granted voluntarily by the
owner. The government may not mandate access because that would constitute a
constitutional taking of property. Florida Power, 480 U.S. at 251. The Supreme Court
upheld the Pole Attachments Act, against a constitutional challenge as a taking of
property because the provision of access was voluntary. The Court said: "[N]othing in
the Pole Attachments Act ... gives cable companies any right to occupy space on
utility poles, or prohibits utility companies from refusing to enter into attachment
agreements with cable operators." Id. Therefore, pole owners can avoid regulation
by denying access to all.
45. Further, when Congress codified the FCC's cross-ownership ban, supra notes
10-12, it preserved the exceptions in the FCC regulations. Subsections 533(b)(3) and
(4) enable the FCC to waive the cross-ownership ban in special circumstances. Sub-
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the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (1984 Cable Act).46
According to § 533(b)(1), telcos are not allowed to provide video
programming directly over their own lines.47 Under, § 533(b)(2),
telcos are not allowed to carry the video programming of cable
companies with which they are affiliated." Video programming is
defined by the 1984 Cable Act as "programming provided by, or
generally considered comparable to programming provided by, a
television broadcast station. '49
This cross-ownership ban has irked telcos, who have been seek-
ing to dismantle barriers preventing them from providing video
programming. Recently, telcos have gained more freedom on ac-
count of several regulatory changes. In 1991, the MFJ ban prevent-
ing RBOCs from providing information services was lifted.50 Also,
with its Video Dialtone Order in the summer of 1992, the FCC
reversed its position on the cross-ownership ban between tele-
phone and cable companies. 1 The FCC advocated repeal of the
ban in order to "increas[e] competition in the video marketplace,
spur[ ] the investment necessary to deploy an advanced infrastruc-
ture, and increas[e] the diversity of services available to the pub-
lic. '' 52 The FCC found that the public interest in allowing telcos to
section 533(b)(3) allows telcos to provide cable services in rural areas that are other-
wise "unlikely to be served by independent cable systems." 47 C.F.R. § 63.58 (1981).
See Final Rule, Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18637, 18646 (1985). The FCC may also waive the ban if
good cause is shown under § 533(b)(4). Good cause may consist of evidence that no
alternative provider will provide cable services in the area, or that new technologies
will benefit the public. See Telephone Company/Cable Television Cross-Ownership
Rules §§ 63.54-58, Further Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 3
F.C.C.R. 5849, 5861, nn. 48-49 (1988).
46. 47 U.S.C. 99 521-557 (1984).
47. See supra note 11.
48. See supra note 12.
49. 47 U.S.C. § 522(19)(1992).
For purposes of this definition, the FCC has ruled that the technological benchmark
is the broadcast television programming provided in 1984, when the 1984 Cable Act
was passed. Telephone Company-Cable. Television Cross-Ownership Rules 7
F.C.C.R. 5781, 5820 (1992) (Second Report and Order, Recommendation to Con-
gress, and Second Further Notice of Proposed, Rulemaking) [hereinafter Video Di-
altone Order]. The C & P district court stated that, because the parties did not
challenge this definition of video programming, it would defer to the FCC's interpre-
tation. 830 F. Supp. at 923 n.21 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,.844 (1984)).
50. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 327 (D.D.C. 1991). For
more information regarding the evolving modification of the final judgment in the
AT&T decree, see infra part V.C.1.
51. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 49.
52. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 49, at 5847.
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compete with cable companies outweighed remaining risks that
telcos would act anticompetitively.5 3 Therefore, in the Video Di-
altone Order, the FCC formally recommended that Congress
amend the 1984 Cable Act to permit telcos "to provide video pro-
gramming directly to subscribers in their telephone service areas,
subject to appropriate safeguards." 54
In the absence of a congressional repeal, however, the FCC had
to retain the cross-ownership provisions codified in the 1984 Cable
Act. To the extent possible while formally obeying the limits im-
posed by § 533(b), the FCC liberalized restrictions on telco entry
into the video industry. Accordingly, while the Video Dialtone Or-
der did not allow telcos to provide "video programming," a cate-
gory comprised of traditional cable services,5 5 telcos are being
permitted to transport video programming produced by others.
This permission allowed telcos to offer the underlying interactive
services required for some programming. 6
Although the developments in the MFJ and the Video Dialtone
Order were promising, telcos were disappointed by the Cable Tele-
vision Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (1992
Cable Act).57 In the 1992 Cable Act, Congress failed to remove
or to modify the cross-ownership ban, § 533(b), from the 1984
Cable Act. Instead, as the C & P district court noted, "[t]he Senate
Report accompanying the 1992 Cable Act expressly affirmed
53. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 49, at 5848-49. The FCC has applied the
Video Dialtone Order to promote competition. For example, the FCC has approved
several video dialtone trial projects conducted by telcos, and a full-scale fiber optic
facility to be operated by New Jersey Bell Telephone in Dover Township, New Jersey.
FCC 94-180 (July 18, 1994). See Frank W. Lloyd, Telco Entry Into Video-Telco Market
Gets a Boost, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1994, at 5.
54. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 49, at 5847.
55. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 49, at 5789 ("Consistent with the Cable Act,
our video dialtone rules will not permit a telephone company to select or have a
cognizable financial interest in video programming, which we find to be the hallmarks
of acting as a traditional cable operator. In order to assure compliance with these
restrictions, telephone companies will not be able to: (1) select video programming by
determining how programming is presented for sale to consumers, including making
decisions concerning the bundling or 'tiering,' or the price, terms and conditions of
video programming offered to consumers, or (2) otherwise have a cognizable financial
interest in, or exercise editorial control over, video programming provided directly to
subscribers within their telephone service areas.").
56. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 49. "Telephone companies would be per-
mitted to provide the underlying interactive capabilities, but not the video program-
ming itself." Id. at 5821-22 n.194.
57. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-58
(1992)).
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the Committee's belief that the § 533(b) ban 'enhance[d]
competition.' "58
C. The Birth of the C & P Case
Bell Atlantic, C & P's parent company, challenged the cross-
ownership ban in 1992 because it was dissatisfied with reregulation
of the cable industry. Further, Bell Atlantic sought to take advan-
tage of the opportunities afforded by the removal of the MFJ ban
on information services. Bell Atlantic, an RBOC, therefore cre-
ated a test case 59 involving C & P,60 its subsidiary that has exclusive
responsibility for local telephone service in parts of Virginia.
On September 24, 1992, Bell Atlantic created Bell Atlantic
Video Services Company (BVS), with the goal of providing video
programming to consumers of C & P's local voice services. Con-
temporaneously, C & P claimed that it would enhance the capacity
of its Alexandria, Virginia, telephone network to carry several hun-
dred channels of video programming.61 C & P stated that these
facilities would be available on a common carrier basis to video
programmers, including BVS, its sister company.62
As a common carrier, C & P is subject to regulations set forth in
subchapter II of the Communications Act. These regulations in-
clude § 533(b), which prohibits C & P from carrying the video pro-
gramming of the affiliated BVS. 63
On December 17, 1992, C & P filed a complaint requesting that
the court invalidate the cross-ownership ban and permit C & P to
carry video programming produced by BVS.64 C & P asserted that
58. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 915 (citing S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 18
(1991)).
59. See Emily Barker, Corporate Counsel; Inside Moves, THE AM. LAW., Oct.
1993, at 42.
60. Memorandum of Intervenor-Def. Nat'l Cable Television Assoc., Inc. in Opp'n
to Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J. & in Supp. of its Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 4 n.2, C & P,
830 F. Supp. at 920 n.17. ("C & P... is incorporated as a Virginia public service
corporation (Va. Code § 56-1) and is a public utility within the definition of § 56-
265.1(b). In accordance with § 56-265.3(A), C & P holds a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity to furnish public utility service. That certificate gives C & P
the right to be the exclusive provider of local telephone service for the area in which it
is certif[ied], absent a showing by a potential alternative provider, to the satisfaction
of the Virginia State Corporation Commission, that the service being rendered by C
& P is inadequate to the requirements of the public necessity and convenience. See
99 56-265.4, 56-265.4:4.")
61. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 911 (citing Alston Aff. at 1-2) (Alston was C & P's Vice
President of Operations & Engineering).
62. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 911 (citing Alston Aff. at 2).
63. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 911.
64. See Plaintiffs' Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 19-21, C & P, 830 F. Supp. 909.
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§ 533(b), the cross-ownership ban, is a direct, content-based ban on
speech, which should be subjected to strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment. Additionally, C & P challenged § 533(b)(2) 65 as an
infringement on its First and Fifth Amendment right to use private
property for expressive purposes.66
Predictably, this important test case attracted interest from nu-
merous parties. The court permitted the National Cable Television
Association (NCTA) to intervene as a defendant and to participate
in all aspects of the litigation. In addition, thirty-three organiza-
tions submitted amici curiae briefs to the district court.
III. The C & P Circuit and District Courts' Holdings Under the
First Amendment
A. Selecting the Intermediate Level of Review
Before selecting the intermediate standard of review, the circuit
court and the district court rejected arguments for applying strict
scrutiny and rational basis review.
The Supreme Court has held that strict scrutiny should be ap-
plied to regulations that restrict speech on the basis of content.
The instruction to apply strict scrutiny to content-based statutes
stems from the First Amendment's preference for freedom of
speech. To survive strict scrutiny, the government must show that a
content-based regulation "is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." 67 In most
cases, government cannot satisfy the stringent requirements of the
strict scrutiny test.68 In fact, in the recent First Amendment case
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court stated that
"[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid. 69
As strict scrutiny is very difficult to satisfy, the crucial juncture in
First Amendment analysis is not the evaluation under strict scru-
tiny, but the decision to apply strict scrutiny in the first place. In
this regard, § 533(b), the cross-ownership ban, overcame a major
obstacle when the C & P courts opted not to apply strict scrutiny.
65. See supra note 12.
66. See Plaintiffs' Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 19-21, C & P, 830 F. Supp. 909.
67. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 917 (quotations omitted).
68. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1849-50 (1992) (rare case of a
law-a Tennessee statute to prevent fraud and intimidation near balloting stations-
that survived strict scrutiny).
69. 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (five Justice majority struck down a statute be-
cause it prohibited only limited types of fighting words, and was therefore content-
based and overbroad) (citations omitted).
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For its strict scrutiny analysis, the circuit court invoked a two-
part test from the Supreme Court's most recent communications
case, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.70 This test evalu-
ates (i) whether, on its face, a regulation confers benefits or im-
poses burdens based on content7' and, if not, (ii) whether the
regulation's "manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the
message it conveys. ' 72 Applying the first part of this test, the cir-
cuit court found that the burden imposed by § 533(b) is not based
on the message conveyed within the video programming, and
therefore the regulation is not, on its face, content-based.73 For the
second part, the circuit court found no illicit government motive in
the history of § 533(b).74 Further, the circuit court considered
whether the structure of § 533(b), i.e., its targeting of a limited
group of speakers, raises suspicions that its objective is to suppress
certain ideas.75 The circuit court dismissed this argument because
membership in the small group of speakers affected by § 533(b) is
based solely on the medium used for speech, e.g., the telephone
lines.
The district court also rejected strict scrutiny. The district court
observed that "[g]overnment regulation of expressive activity is
content-neutral [and not subject to strict scrutiny] so long as it is
'justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.' "76 The district court compared § 533(b) to the regulation
limiting the location of adult theaters in Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres,77 finding that both statutes were content-neutral because their
primary aim was to control secondary effects. Specifically, § 533(b)
70. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *33 (citing Turner Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445,2459 (1994) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))).
71. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *33 (citing Turner Broadcasting, 114
S. Ct. at 2459 n.19 & 2460).
72. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *33-34 (quoting Turner Broadcasting,
114 S. Ct. at 2461).
73. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *35. See also C & P, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 32985, at *39 (quoting Regan v. Time, 468 U.S. 641, 656 (1984), for proposi-
tion that § 533(b) is not content-based because, in determining whether video pro-
gramming is. being transmitted, "the Government does not need to evaluate the
nature of the message being imparted."), and C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at
*43 ("Because Section 533(b)'s speaker distinction is thus justifiable entirely on the
basis of the peculiar economic and physical venue inherent to cable communications,
we conclude that it is not an improper content-based distinction.").
74. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *44.
75. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *47-48.
76. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 924 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) emphasis omitted)).
77. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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is motivated not by the content of the signal transmitted, but rather
by secondary concerns about diversity and competition in the video
programming marketplace. 78
In addition, both courts rejected the government's argument that
rational basis review applies to § 533(b). The circuit court declined
to apply minimal scrutiny for four reasons. First, the court echoed
Turner Broadcasting in distinguishing the cable industry from the
broadcasting industry. In broadcasting, the problem of allocating
the limited number of broadcasting frequencies justifies federal in-
tervention and regulations. In contrast, there is no inherent physi-
cal scarcity, such as spectrum, that affects the cable industry, and
no basis for federal economic regulation. Therefore, cable regula-
tions merit a higher level of First Amendment scrutiny than the
review applied to the economic regulations governing the broad-
casting industry.79 Second, the circuit court repudiated appellants'
argument, based on FCC v. National Citizens Commission for
Broadcasting (NCCB),80 that minimal scrutiny applies to all regula-
tions prohibiting cross-ownership of different modes of communi-
cations in the same market. Relying again on the distinctions
between cable transmission and broadcasting, the circuit court
stated that NCCB's reasoning applied only in broadcasting cases
and therefore was inapplicable in C & P.81
Third, the circuit court rejected appellants' argument that
minimal scrutiny applied to regulations conditioned upon accept-
ance of monopoly benefits by common carriers, e.g., telcos. The
court found this quid pro quo argument to be unpersuasive be-
cause, whereas the monopoly benefit of local telephone franchises
is conferred by state and local governments, § 533(b) is a burden
imposed by the federal government.82 Finally, the circuit court de-
clined to follow the Supreme Court's holding in Associated Press v.
United States8 3 that media organizations cannot be shielded from
all regulations, and therefore minimal scrutiny still applies to eco-
nomic regulations in this industry. The circuit court rejected this
78. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 924.
79. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *27-29 (citing Turner Broadcasting,
114 S. Ct. at 2457-58).
80. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
81. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *29-30 (citing NCCB, 436 U.S. at 799-
800).
82. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *31-32.
83. 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See infra part V.C.
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argument because § 533(b) is not one of the "generally-applicable
antitrust laws." 4
In the district court, Judge Ellis declined to apply minimal scru-
tiny because § 533(b), the cross-ownership ban, has a dispropor-
tionate impact on expressive conduct.8 5  Although arguably
§ 533(b) is merely a structural, economic statute that is not aimed
at speech, the statute "is a direct abridgement of the telephone
companies' right to [speak]."s Therefore, the statute must be sub-
jected to a more stringent constitutional test than mere rational
basis review.
B. Applying the Intermediate Test to C & P
Thus, both the circuit court 7 and district courts in C'& P de-
cided to apply an intermediate standard of review. 9 Under the
Supreme Court's intermediate test stated in United States v.
O'Brien,' a content-neutral regulation will be sustained if" 'it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the gov-
ernmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest.' "91
84. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *32. See infra part V.C.
85. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 921 (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minne-
sota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983)).
86. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 921-22 (comparing with Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,
478 U.S. 697 (1986)).
87. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *54.
88. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 926.
89. The application of intermediate review is supported by the Supreme Court's
ruling in Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. 2445. Decided approximately ten months
after the C & P district court decision, Turner Broadcasting considered the constitu-
tionality of a federal statute, the must-carry regulation, requiring cable companies to
carry local commercial and noncommercial educational broadcast stations. Turner
Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. 2445. Turner Broadcasting also applied the intermediate test
because, like § 533(b), the must-carry regulations under review were found to be con-
tent-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech. Turner Broad-
casting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. 781, and O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367).
90. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien considered whether, under the First Amend-
ment, a federal regulation prohibiting the burning of draft cards was constitutional.
O'Brien alleged that the burning was symbolic speech. Id. at 376. In its analysis, the
Supreme Court sought to determine, among other things, whether the regulation fur-
thered an important or substantial governmental interest, and was an incidental re-
striction that was no greater than essential to further the government's interest. Id. at
377. The Court held that the anti-burning regulation did further the substantial gov-
ernment interest in the continued availability of issued draft cards, and was narrowly
tailored to achieve that goal. Id. at 382.
91. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
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The Supreme Court refined the O'Brien test in Ward v. Rock
Against Racism.92 Ward commands that the regulation need not be
the most narrowly tailored one possible, provided ample alterna-
tive means of communication remain available.93 The Supreme
Court's Turner Broadcasting decision interpreted Ward to hold that
a regulation will be found constitutional "so long as the... regula-
tion promotes a substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation." 94 In other words,
narrow tailoring requires that "the means chosen do not 'burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the govern-
ment's legitimate interests.' -95 Summarizing edicts from O'Brien,
Ward and perhaps Turner Broadcasting, the C & P circuit court
isolated three separate prongs: (i) the interests that § 533(b) pur-
ports to serve must be "significant," (ii) § 533(b) must be "nar-
rowly tailored" to serve those interests, and (iii) where § 533(b)
regulates transmission of information, the regulation must "leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of [that]
information. 96
Both the circuit court and district court in C & P held that, under
the intermediate test, § 533(b) did not pass constitutional muster
because it is not narrowly tailored.
Following its own three prong test, the circuit court found that,
although § 533(b) satisfied the first prong (significant government
interest), the regulation failed under the second prong (narrow tai-
loring) and the third prong (ample alternatives). Specifically, the
first prong was satisfied because the circuit court recognized the
significant governmental interest in preventing both cross-subsidi-
zation97 and "network-access discrimination," as the court termed
discrimination in the era of video programming transmission.98
The circuit court did not dwell long on this issue, as the Supreme
Court had clearly ruled in the recent Turner Broadcasting case that
"[t]he government's interest in eliminating restraints on fair com-
92. The case held a New York City guideline governing concerts in Central Park
to be valid under the First Amendment as a reasonable regulation of the place and
manner of protected speech. Ward, 491 U.S. at 790-803.
93. Ward, 491 U.S. at 789-91. Ward also advised that content-neutral restrictions
on the time, place or manner of speech do not require strict scrutiny. Id
94. 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985))).
95. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
96. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *54.
97. Cross-subsidization occurs when a firm shifts costs from production in a com-
petitive market into production in a monopoly market. See infra note 245.
98. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *54-56.
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petition is always substantial, even where the individuals or entities
subject to particular regulations are engaged in expressive activity
protected by the First Amendment.""
Under the second prong, the circuit court held that § 533(b) is
not narrowly tailored because it burdens substantially more speech
than necessary to achieve the government's goal in preyenting
telcos from dominating the market.1'0 In reaching this holding, the
circuit court agreed with the district court that there are obvious,
less burdensome alternatives to § 533(b). 101 For instance, regula-
tors could require telcos to lease a portion of their channels on a
common carrier basis to companies and individuals seeking to pro-
vide video programming. 2Finally, § 533(b) did not satisfy the third prong of the circuit
court's test either. 3 In analyzing the question of whether ample
alternative methods of communications remain available, the cir-
cuit court considered whether the remaining avenues of communi-
cation are sufficiently similar to the method foreclosed by
§ 533(b).0 4 The circuit court found that § 533(b) does not meet
this requirement because it "bars absolutely the telephone compa-
nies from entering, with editorial discretion, the cable television
market" serving their local audience. 05 Targeting an audience of
common carrier subscribers could be construed to be a "particular
manner or type of expression at a given time or place."'16 The cir-
cuit court found that § 533(b) prohibits telcos from speaking in this
manner, and that alternative methods of communications are un-
available. 07 The circuit court considered telcos' ability to offer
99. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *55 (quoting Turner Broadcasting, 114
S. Ct. at 2470). Also, regarding diversity in ownership of media sources, the circuit
court followed Turner Broadcasting's statement "that [a]ssuring that the public has
access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the high-
est order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment." C & P, 1994 U.S.
App.:LEXIS 32985, at *55 (quoting Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470).
100. C& P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *66-67?(citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 799,
and quoting Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470).
101. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *66 (citing C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 930-
31).
102. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *66 (citing Video Dialtone Order,
supra note 49, at 5781).
103. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *71.
104. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *68 (citation omitted).
105. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *69.
106. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *69-70 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 802;
other citations omitted).
107. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *69-70 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 802;
other citations omitted).
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video programming outside of their service area to be irrelevant to
the question whether telcos could choose to serve subscribers to
their common carrier services.'08
Similarly, the C & P district court had found that § 533(b) did
not pass constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny. The
district court held that § 533(b) is not narrowly tailored' °9 because
it represents an extreme response to the problem of concentration
of economic power in the media marketplace. The district court
stated that "[t]here is no more draconian approach to solving the
problem of potential anti-competitive practices by telephone com-
panies in the cable television industry than a complete bar on their
entry into that industry."' 10 Numerous alternative measures for
controlling anticompetitive telco behavior indicated to the district
court that there is "an entire range of effective alternatives that
would burden substantially less speech than § 533(b)."'1 The
court therefore held that the existence of less restrictive alterna-
tives indicated that the cross-ownership ban was overbroad.1 2
C. Judicial Deference to Congress
In reaching their holdings, both the circuit court and the district
court acknowledged that it is improper for courts to put themselves
in the place of legislatures. For instance, the circuit court stated
that, in determining whether a statute is narrowly tailored, the
court "generally afford[s] great weight to the decisions of Congress
and the experience of the FCC. 1" 3 Also, the district court stated
that "courts must not substitute their judgment on policy matters
for that of Congress.""u4
This deference is limited, however. As the circuit court ob-
served, deference is extended only where Congress has made fac-
tual findings regarding the need for the particular measure
108. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *69.
109. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 928.
110. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 928.
111. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 931-32 n.33 (comparing with Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689).
112. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 928. "In short, if there exists a range of regulatory
strategies that would effectively eliminate the threat of anti-competitive conduct by
the telephone companies in the cable television industry, then § 533(b) would 'burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate
interests,' and would therefore violate the First Amendment." Id.
113. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *57 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)).
114. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 928 (comparing with Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984)(reversing Court of Appeals for disagreeing
with Park Service over existence of less speech-restrictive alternatives)).
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enacted." 5 The district court also objected to the notion that
courts should assume that Congress always fully considers the con-
stitutional implications of passing regulations that limit free speech.
The district court observed that, if courts always infer that Con-
gress has fully contemplated the impact of its legislation, judicial
review would not. be required and the narrow-tailoring prong of
the O'Brien test would be reduced to a "nullity."" 6
Thus, despite discussing the deference that should be accorded
to Congress, after reviewing the legislative history, neither the cir-
cuit court nor district court found an adequate factual basis in the
record to support § 533(b). The circuit court stated that "Congress
did not buttress Section 533(b) with any underlying factual find-
ings," including adequate legislative history.117 The circuit court
did not consider the FCC's findings to provide adequate support
for Congressional actions, particularly because the FCC did not
devote enough attention to alternative, less drastic regulatory
schemes. Furthermore, the FCC's contemporaneous discussions
about the pole access rule, which was codified as § 533(b)," 8 did
not contemplate the complexities involved in. the cable transport
and video programming markets.1 9 Similarly, the district court ob-
served that "nowhere in the legislative materials is there any indi-
cation that Congress reached a conclusion concerning the
"1120effectiveness of less restrictive regulatory measures ....
IV. Essential Facilities Analysis in the Noninteractive and
Interactive Relevant Product Markets
As mentioned in the preceding Part, courts applying the inter-
mediate O'Brien test, as refined by Ward, should uphold a regula-
tion if it promotes a substantial governmental interest that would
be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' 2' The C & P
courts found that § 533(b), the cross-ownership ban, fails this inter-
mediate test. Section 533(b) was found to be unconstitutional
115. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *57-58 (citations omitted).
116. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 929.
117. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *63.
118. See supra part II.
119. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *63-64.
120. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 929. The court reviewed both a 1984 House Committee
Report, H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1984), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
4655, 4693, and a 1991 Senate Committee Report, S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 18 (1991), reprinted in U.S.C;C.A.N. 1133, 1150. Neither report addressed the
question of less restrictive alternatives, according to the court.
121. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quot-
ing Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689)).
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under the First Amendment because allegedly the governmental
interest could be promoted through alternative measures that bur-
den substantially less speech.122
The antitrust portion of this Note seeks to contradict the courts'
holdings that § 533(b) is too "draconian," as the district called it,123
and that alternative measures would adequately achieve the gov-
ernmental interest in preventing telcos' anti-competitive practices.
In general, this Part discusses the antitrust concerns underlying the
cross-ownership ban in order to show that Congress was reason-
able in including § 533(b) in the 1984 Cable Act and neglecting to
repeal it in the 1992 Cable Act. The C & P courts should therefore
have deferred to the fact-finding, legislative branch of government.
To support this premise, this Part will show that § 533(b) is nec-
essary to prevent anticompetitive behavior by telcos based on con-
trol over the essential facilities for switching and billing. This
discussion reviews technologies comprising the information high-
way, posits the two relevant product markets of noninteractive and
interactive video programming transmission, and analyzes' telcos'
competitive position in these two markets. 24
A. The Relevant Product Markets
Before determining whether a firm possesses an essential facility
that is necessary for competition in the market, the relevant prod-
uct market must be defined. 125 Defining the relevant product mar-
122. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 931 (comparing with Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689 n.33).
123. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 928.
124. Please note that throughout this paper predictions are made about technology
and the division of power in markets based on that technology. Due to the rapid
evolution of video programming transmission technology, these predictions are neces-
sarily based on independent judgment.
125. Unlike the relevant product market, the relevant geographical market is more
easily defined. According to antitrust principles, the geographical market is also de-
fined by analyzing substitutability. For the geographical analysis, the market is de-
fined as the area within which consumers might travel, following an increase in price,
in order to purchase a substitute product.
The relevant geographical market for telecommunications usually includes the local
infrastructure, whether it consists of cable or telephone lines. Implementation of Sec-
tion 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, 1994 FCC LEXIS 5322, at *35 (citation omitted) (Sept. 28, 1994)
[hereinafter Video Programming Assessment]. If the product market includes some
type of wireless cable, the market might extend as far as the signal can reach over the
air. The definition of the geographical product market may also depend on the pres-
ence of earth-based, mediating facilities requiring line-of-sight connections. Id. at
*76. Regarding the C & P case, the relevant geographical market was C & P's territo-
ries in Virginia.
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ket requires a determination of the cross-elasticity of demand for a
given product. Cross-elasticity is measured by considering which
products consumers would willingly ,substitute, following changes
in price, for the product in question.126 Cross-elasticity is high if
consumers willingly substitute one product for another on a regular
basis, and low if reasonable consumers will interchange products
only following significant increases in the price of the preferred
product. The relevant product market is limited to products con-
sumers will accept as substitutes following typical fluctuations in
price, and does not include products that consumers refuse to
accept.
The role of cross-elasticity shows that demand by consumers-
rather than the content of the product considered in the abstract-
is the most important factor in delineating the relevant product
market. For example, although cellophane and aluminum foil are
not similar substances, the willingness of consumers to use one or
the other, i.e., accept them as substitute products, indicates that
they belong in the same product market. Thus, in United States v.
duPont & Company, the applicable market was defined to include
all "flexible packaging materials," because of the high cross-elastic-
ity of demand between aluminum foil products and duPont's
cellophane.127
1. Background: The Technology
Delineating the relevant product market for the purposes of this
Note is difficult because the technologies capable of delivering
video programming are evolving rapidly.128 This discussion there-
fore provides only an overview that will likely be outdated soon
after the date of publication of this Note. Nevertheless, to provide
some context for the legal discussion that follows, below is an ex-
planation of technologies currently being used to convey video pro-
gramming, including fiber optic wiring, coaxial cable, copper-
twisted pair wiring, Narrowband Integrated Services Digital Net-
126. Video Programming Assessment, supra note 125, at *32 n.87.
127. 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956) (duPont did not possess monopoly power, even
though it produced almost 75% of all cellophane sold in the United States, because
the market was defined to include other materials). See also United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa) (market defined to
include scrap, as well as virgin, ingot).
128. Video Programming Assessment, supra note 125, at *182. ("The foregoing dis-
cussion suggests that it is too soon to draw any conclusions regarding the ongoing
dynamics of technological change that permeate the telecommunications industry
today.")
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work (N-ISDN), satellite, wireless, smart terminal and hybrid
technologies.
To begin, one of the most advanced types of technology is fiber
optic wiring. Fiber optic wiring transmits digital signals at the
speed of light.12 9 The advantages of fiber optic wiring are that dis-
tortion is reduced by using digital signals, transmission at the speed
of light allows for real-time communications,'130 and the wiring usu-
ally has adequate capacity to transmit multiple signals. All compa-
nies involved in information highway services, including telcos,
cable companies and even electric companies,' 3' may eventually
upgrade their facilities by installing fiber optic wiring.
A less advanced but common type of wiring is copper coaxial
cable. One advantage of copper coaxial wiring that makes it par-
ticularly well-suited for cable is that it can transmit multiple signals
129. The capacity of cables to carry information is measured according to
bandwidth, which is the number of waves (or hertz) that pass through a line per sec-
ond. To compare, coaxial cable systems in 1992 had a potential bandwidth of 1 billion
hertz (1 gigahertz), and twisted-pair copper telephone wiring has a capacity of 4,000
hertz. George Gilder, Cable's Secret Weapon, FORBES, Apr. 13, 1992, at 80 [hereinaf-
ter Gilder Secret Weapon]. Fiber optic wiring has a far superior capacity to either
coaxial cable or copper twisted-pair, with a bandwidth of close to 2.9 gigahertz.
George Gilder, Metcalfe's Law and Legacy, FORBES ASAP: A TECH. SUPPLEMENT,
Sept. 13, 1993, at §158 [hereinafter Gilder Metcalfe's Law]. In addition, fiber optic
wires are thinner and more flexible than copper, twisted-pair wires. DATAPRO RE-
SEARCH, AN INTRODUCrION TO TELEPHONY 4 (Jan. 1991). Thus, whereas copper,
twisted-pair systems can deliver 24 voice calls, fiber optics can deliver 37,500 voice
calls during the same period. DATAPRO RESEARCH, FIBER OPTIC COMMUNICATIONS:-
ISSUES AND TRENDS 2 (Apr. 1990).
When fiber is combined with advanced switching technology, such as Broadband
Integrated Services Digital Network (B-ISDN), it can carry approximately 50,000 to
60,000 simultaneous telephone conversations, or about 20,000 simultaneous television
channels, or 6,500 High Definition TeleVision (HDTV) channels. Bill Hancock,
There's Definitely Fiber in Your Future; Broadband ISDN Gets the Most Out of Fiber-
Optic Communications Line Bandwidth, DIGITAL REVIEW, Aug. 5, 1991, at 28. Digi-
tal telephone lines using ISDN can operate at 144 kilobits per second (a bit is a unit of
information storage capacity). Gilder, Metcalfe's Law, supra at § 158.
130. "Real-time" means that there is no delay between transmission and receipt of
the communication.
131. See Steven R. Rivkin, Look Who's Wiring the Home Now, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
26, 1993, at § 6 (Magazine), at 46. Rivkin states that while the cable and telephone
companies compete for the right to provide video programming, electric companies
are installing new wiring equipped with fiber optic lines. The electric companies will
have the capacity to provide video programming to the home, and they will recoup
their investment by installing interactive services to increase energy efficiency. While
this technology is currently in the testing phase, the outlook is encouraging. Id.
See also Video Programming Assessment, supra note 125, at *117-20. In addition to
capitalizing on savings from increased energy efficiency, electric utilities' installation
of wiring for video programming transmission is also economically attractive because
they already have many of the necessary rights-of-way. Id. at *119.
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simultaneously. A disadvantage of copper coaxial cable, however,
is that the need to boost the signal might hinder the provision of
interactive communications over long distances. Copper coaxial
cable can transmit analog signals, which do not become very dis-
torted when the transmission is limited to distances under three
hundred feet.'32 For transmissions of longer distance, coaxial cable
requires an amplifier to repeat the signal so that it is strong enough
to overcome electric resistance on the line.133 This amplification
process creates noise, or distortion, of the signal.'3
One of the older forms of technology is copper twisted-pair wir-
ing, which was used in building the original telephone infrastruc-
ture. Copper twisted-pair wiring is not well-suited for the one-way
delivery of video programming and similar communications be-
cause it does not have as much capacity, as coaxial cable or fiber
optics. As much of the telephone infrastructure consists of copper
twisted-pair wiring, however, telcos have been developing methods
to provide video-over-copper. Video-over-copper will compress
more information into the signal and through the copper twisted-
pair wiring. 35 For example, AT&T Paradyne and Compression
Labs are combining advanced modulation and video compression
technology to create a new device to deliver video services over
residential telephone lines.136 If successfully deployed, video-over-
copper will obviate the need to install fiber optic wiring. Neverthe-
less, telephone central office switches would probably need to be
upgraded. In addition, success of video-over-copper is by no
means certain.137 .
132. Gilder, Secret Weapon, supra note 129.
133. Gilder, Secret Weapon, supra note 129.
134. Gilder, Secret Weapon, supra note 129.
135. See Robert X. Cringely, You're the Viewer. Choose a Program., N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 1993, at A17. Cringely describes the RBOCs' discovery of AT&T Bell Labo-
ratory technology that can send a digital video signal, including stereo sound, over
existing telephone lines. Cringely states that, although the service is limited to house-
holds within three miles of a central telephone office, this category includes at least
80% of people in the United States. Id.
136. This device would include Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) and
Compressed Digital Video technologies. ADSL transports video-over-copper through
use of Carrierless, Amplitude/Phase (CAP) modulation, which allows high bandwidth
services over the copper, twisted-pair wiring that often connects to the home. The
compressed signal will allow the companies to squeeze the signal over the relatively
narrow copper line. AT&T, Compression Labs, Developing Device to Deliver Video
Over Phone Lines, COMMUNICAMONS DAILY, Jan. 20, 1993, at 2.
137. Edmund L. Andrews, The Homely Phone Proves a Tough Act to Follow, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1994, at C8. "AT&T and MCI both tried to launch a new generation of
videophones three years ago, using new data-compression technology to squeeze all
1994]
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As another measure to upgrade its infrastructure to support
video programming transmission, telcos might install a switching
technology, called Narrowband Integrated Services Digital Net-
work (N-ISDN). N-ISDN is beneficial because it facilitates the
transport of analog signals originating at subscribers' copper lines
over digital networks, preventing further distortion of the signal.
In addition to N-ISDN, telcos are developing Asynchronous Trans-
fer Mode (ATM) technology to provide interactive, multimedia
communications.138
Video programming may also be carried by technologies other
than the "hardwiring"' 139 of fiber optics or coaxial cable. Potential
alternative technologies include Home Satellite Dishes (HSDs), 14°
Satellite Master Antenna Television (SMATV),'141 Multi-channel
Multi-point Distribution Systems (MMDS), 142 Direct Broadcast
the information over a single ordinary phone line. But the pictures are jerky and
distracting, and sales have been minimal." Id.
138. Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) is a digital multiplexing and switching
technology developed and standardized by the world's telcos to integrate the trans-
mission of voice, video and data communications. Bob Metcalfe, The Future of
LANs; Do LAN Managers See Asynchronous Transfer Mode Technology in Their
Networking Future?, INFOWORLD, May 24, 1993, at 67. Metcalfe, the inventor of the
local area network (LAN) technology, the Ethernet, suggests "you think of ATM as
packet switching revamped to incorporate voice and video in computer networks."
Id. He also thinks that it may take twenty years before ATM is fully standardized and
deployed.
139. The term "hardwiring" is used within this Note to distinguish between infor-
mation infrastructure composed entirely of wires, and hybrid systems using wireless
or satellite communications as part of or as-a substitute for wires.
140. HSDs enable private individuals to receive video signals directly from satellite
providers. Video Programming Assessment, supra note 125, at *60-61. See generally
id. at *60-67 (discussing potential for HSDs to compete with cable systems in the
video programming transmission market).
141. SMATV is similar to HSD, except that the signal is transmitted to multiple,
locally situated recipients. For example, landlords may install SMATV to provide
video signals to all of their residents. Video Programming Assessment, supra note
125, at *80. See generally idi at *79-86 (discussing potential for SMATV to compete
with cable in the video programming transmission market).
142. MMDS uses an omnidirectional microwave signal to deliver video program-
ming to a fixed receiving antenna. Reexamination of the Effective Competition Stan-
dard for the Regulation of Cable Television Basic Serv. Rates, 5 F.C.C.R. 259, 267
n.31 (1990). MMDS is also known as "wireless cable." Video Programming Assess-
ment, supra note 125, at *67. See generally id. at *67-79 (discussing potential for wire-
less cable to compete with cable in the video programming transmission market).
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Satellites (DBS), 143  Local Multipoint Distribution Service
(LMDS)'" and traditional broadcast television.1 45
In addition, a futuristic notion is that communications may be
provided by relying on "smart terminals," or computers. This sys-
tem includes fiber optic wiring to the "curb," connecting to coaxial
wiring between the curb and the home, and ending at a smart ter-
minal in the home. A major proponent of this idea, George Gilder,
proposes using "smart terminals" at the end of each line to sort the
exponentially increasing number of signals that can be sent over
fiber optic wiring.14 He predicts that the smart terminals, which
continue to become faster and otherwise more capable, will be able
to sort quickly through the many received messages in order to
select the messages intended for that location. 147 Similar to broad-
casting, all signals will reach all recipients, and each recipient will
be able to choose which signals to receive. While enticing, this the-
ory will probably not be practical until the capacities of fiber optic
wiring and computers are increased.
Perhaps the most probable future scenario is the installation of
hybrid networks.148 Following the American tradition, consumers
may simply demand more choices (e.g., wireless cable for the car
and fiber optics at home) instead of substituting one telecommuni-
143. DBS service refers to satellites that transmit signals intended for reception by
the general public. Video Programming Assessment, supra note 125, at *51 (citation
omitted). According to the FCC's report in September, 1994, this service is being
offered only by Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc./DirecTV and United States
Satellite Broadcasting. A "medium power DBS," using signals in a different
bandwidth, is being offered by Primestar. Id. EchoStar Communications Corpora-
tion is also raising money to enter the market. Id. at *57-58. See generally id. at *52-
60 (discussing potential for DBS services to compete with cable in the video program-
ming transmission market).
144. LMDS is a new technology, similar to MMDS, in which multiple channels of
video programming are transmitted using high-frequency microwave channels. Video
Programming Assessment, supra note 125, at *111. See generally id. at *111-14 (dis-
cussing potential for LMDS services to compete with cable in the video programming
transmission market).
145. See generally Video Programming Assessment, supra note 125, at *87-92 (dis-
cussing potential for broadcasting to remain competitive with cable in the video pro-
gramming transmission market).
146. George Gilder, A Work in the Making: Into the Fibersphere, FORBES, Dec. 7,
1992, at 111 [hereinafter Into the Fibersphere]; Gilder, Metcalfe's Law, supra note 129,
at 158.
147. Into the Fibersphere, supra note 146, at 111; Gilder, Metcalfe's Law, supra note
129, at 158.
148. For a discussion of the different types of hybrid possibilities, see Video Pro-
gramming Assessment, supra note 125, at *101-02.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXII
cations medium for another. 149 In addition, the companies operat-
ing the information highway might construct hybrid networks that
combine technologies to transport signals from one point to an-
other. For example, a system might use fiber optic trunk lines to
deliver programming to the curb. Then, from the curb to the
home, companies will rely on fiber optic or coaxial cable wiring.
Satellites or wireless cable may be used to transport the signal
across long distances, or to save costs. 150
2. Noninteractive and Interactive Relevant Product Markets
The types of information highway services that will be demanded
by consumers are unpredictable. Although any predictions are
therefore suspect, this Note nevertheless postulates two basic rele-
vant product markets: noninteractive and interactive services.
The distinction between these relevant product markets depends
on whether the transmission technology supports interactivity, or is
capable of transmitting information only one-way. This Note con-
siders "interactivity" to describe a system that provides users at
both ends with the same capacity to transmit information, and en-
ables information to flow in both directions. In other words, infor-
mation consumers should have the opportunity to act as
information providers. Furthermore, in order to promote dialogue
rather than the exchange of static information, "interactions" be-
tween two users should occur as close in time as possible.
According to this definition, interactivity is present in telephone
conversations and computer bulletin board system conferences us-
ing copper-twisted pair or fiber optic wiring. Interactivity is also
present in video conferences conducted over fiber optic wiring.
In contrast, this definition would not encompass "video juke
boxes," "pay-per-view" or "movies-on-demand," all of which re-
quire the consumer to place an "order" via another medium, such
as the telephone or through a restricted communications pathway,
in order to receive the requested video programming. For exam-
ple, a columnist for Forbes magazine observed that the noise on
149. See Joseph N. Pelton, Why Nicholas Negroponte is wrong about the future of
telecommunications; The Future of Telecommunications: Special Section, TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS, Jan. 1993, at 35.
150. This hybrid scenario is especially likely because of the global nature of the
telecommunications infrastructure. One commentator noted: "Today at least sixty
percent of all overseas telecommunication traffic and over eighty percent of interna-
tional television exchange occurs through a global satellite system that now serves
over 185 countries. This fact alone should suggest that the world has not yet em-
braced an 'all fiber' approach . . . ." See Pelton, supra note 149, at 35.
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cable companies' coaxial cable would "virtually prohibit efficient
two-way communications .... Because of this limitation, most
pay-per-view CATV systems and the various shopping channels de-
pend upon both cable and telephone companies: [c]ustomers see
the video programming via cable, but they order films or merchan-
dise over the phone." 151. In addition, home-shopping that broad-
casts video programming of products for sale and relies on
telephones for ordering would not qualify as "interactive" under
this definition. The ability to pay bills by "pointing and clicking"
on icons also does not qualify as fully "interactive" because it does
not allow recipients to upload an equivalent type of content.
Although all of the technologies mentioned in Part IV.A.1. are
capable of supporting one-way transmission of video programming,
few currently support video programming that is "interactive," ac-
cording to the definition within this Note. For instance, DirecTV
claims to offer an interactive DBS service because a modem in the
equipment that receives the DBS signal can send signals over the
telephone lines. 52 Although it enables consumers to order pay-
per-view movies, 153 DirecTV does not permit communications 'be-
tween subscribers and therefore is not "interactive" as defined
within this Note. Similarly, NYNEX is claiming that its delivery of
video-on-demand through a hybrid fiber-coaxial cable system is
"interactive."' 54 NYNEX's system is not "interactive" because,
while end users are able to communicate their choices to
NYNEX's video information provider systems, they cannot trans-
mit, or upload, their own programming over the system. Also, the
Interactive Video and Data Services, (IVDS)' 55 that wireless cable
promises will probably not be fully "interactive" because a limited
151. Gilder, Secret Weapon, supra note 129, at 80 .(emphasis added).
152. Video Programming Assessment, supra note 125, at *59 (citation omitted).
See also supra note 143.
153. Dana Blankenhorn, DirecTV and USSB: Separate But Unequal Services Build
Compatibility Into Technology, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Oct. 31, 1994, at 19. ("[Dir-
ecTV] send[s] a signal through the satellite to [the consumers'] set-top box, initializing
it and opening channels or authorizing pay-per-view").
154. Video Programming Assessment, supra note 125, at *105 & nn.330-31 (citation
omitted) ("NYNEX employs a 'video juke box' to deliver stored and timeshifted
video information provider programming to the limited base of interactive trial end-
users, with VCR-like functionalities").
155. The FCC has been auctioning off spectrum for this experimental technology, a
process that started in 1991. FCC, FCC Proposes Establishment of Interactive Video
Data Service in the 218-218.5 MHz Band (Gen. Docket 91-2), Report No. DC-1788;
Docket No. 91-2, 1991 FCC LEXIS 144, JaI. 10, 1991.
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signal capacity may restrict communications to activities like send-
ing orders based on a previously arranged account.156
Interactive video programming, as "interactivity" is defined here
and as opposed to interactive communications like telephone con-.
versations or BBSs, is available currently only for users connected
by fiber optic wiring. 157 While this represents a limited universe of
users, it is important to consider the impact of the C & P case on
the legislature's ability to regulate potential providers of such inter-
active video programming services. As discussed in the next sub-
section, if telcos are allowed into both the video programming
transmission and content markets of today, their ability to act an-
ticompetitively may distort the interactive video programming
market of tomorrow.
B. Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine in the
Noninteractive and Interactive Relevant Product
Markets
To address the issue of anticompetitive concerns implicated by
telcos' providing video programming in their local service areas,
the antitrust laws should be considered. The law pertinent in this
situation is the Sherman Act. 158 According to the Supreme Court,
the goal of the Sherman Act is to "preserv[e] free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade."' 59 To achieve this goal, Section 2
of the Sherman Act"w makes it a crime for any person to "monop-
olize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States."''
Monopoly power is defined as "the power to control prices or
exclude competition.' 6a 2 This definition is not necessarily intuitive
because, in ordinary usage, "monopoly" refers to a firm that has
sole control over the supply of a particular good or service. For the
156. Michael Dresser, Low-Cost Interactive Upstart, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 28,
1994, at 14C.
157. As discussed above, in the future compression technology may allow use of
other connections. See supra notes 135-138.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
159. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See also National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-95 (1978); United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
162. U.S. v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); United
States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). See also PmiLLip AREEDA & LoUIS
KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIs 38 (4th ed. 1988).
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purposes of antitrust analysis, however, monopoly power exists
when one firm has the ability to manipulate the market and fix
163prices.
In the past, telecommunications infrastructure has been consid-
ered to constitute a "natural monopoly." According to traditional
theories, a "natural monopoly" exists when the market can natu-
rally support only one provider.164 To consider whether telcos pos-
sess a natural monopoly in the video programming market, this
Note applies one theory of natural monopoly: the essential facili-
ties doctrine. 165
The essential facilities doctrine considers whether courts should
intervene to mandate access to a firm's facilities when a firm pos-
sesses "bottleneck control." To explain the analogy, when a firm
possesses "bottleneck control," it can prevent entry into a market
by barring a potential competitor from passing through the "neck"
to gain access to the "bottle," i.e., the market. When a firm pos-
sesses such control in a market, courts may intervene. For exam-
ple, Judge Greene invoked the notion of bottleneck control, a.k.a.
the essential facilities doctrine, when he ordered the break-up of
AT&T. 166
Professor Phillip Areeda has crystallized the essential facilities
doctrine into a three-step test.167 The test states that a single firm's
facility will create a bottleneck (i.e., be essential for access) when:
163. Monopoly power may be present when the firm is one of many in a market.
On the other hand, if the possibility of competition from a firm presently outside the
market prevents a sole supplier from manipulating prices, a sole supplier will not be
found to exert monopoly power. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
See generally William J. Baumol et al., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRY STRucruE (rev. ed. 1988). This book discusses the theory of "perfect
contestability," in which the absence of barriers, such as sunk costs, provides for free
entry into (contestable) markets. If a market is perfectly contestable, then a monopo-
list in that market will not be able to charge high prices without inviting competition
from a new entrant with lower prices. Id. at 5-7.
164. See, e.g., U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,430 (1945). "A mar-
ket may, for example, be so limited that it is impossible to produce at all and meet the
cost of production except by a plant large enough to supply the whole demand." Id.
165. Telcos' monopoly power in the video programming transmission market is an-
alyzed according to the essential facilities doctrine because the doctrine provides a
rigorous framework.
166. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 171 ("the overriding fact is that the principal means by
which AT&T has maintained monopoly power in telecommunications has been its
control of the Operating Companies with their strategic bottleneck position.") (em-
phasis added).
167. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles,
58 ANr usr L.J. 841, 852 (1989) [hereinafter Essential Facilities].
For examples of the application of the premises underlying Areeda's essential facili-
ties doctrine, see United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 398 (1912) ("The
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1) a potential market entrant cannot compete effectively with-
out it;
2) duplication or practical alternatives are unavailable (or unec-
onomic); and
3) the potential entrant is essential for'competition. 16
1. Noninteractive Video Programming Transmission
Applying Areeda's test to the relevant product market of
noninteractive video programming transmission, telcos do not have
essential facilities. In fact, this market is dominated, if not monop-
olized, by cable companies. 69
Specifically, the FCC has found that cable television remains the
dominant medium for providing consumers with multiple channels
of video programming. 70 In addition, the House conference re-
port accompanying the 1992 Cable Act stated: "For a variety of
reasons, including local franchising requirements and the ex-
traordinary expense of constructing more than one cable television
system to serve a particular geographic area, most cable television
subscribers have no opportunity to select between competing cable
systems." The same House report also observed that cable televi-
sion systems had achieved significant penetration levels, with over
sixty percent of households with television subscribing to cable. 1
physical conditions which compel the use of the combined system by every road which
desires to cross the river, either to serve the commerce of the city or to connect with
lines separated by the river, is the factor which gives greatest color to the unlawful-
ness of the combination as now controlled and operated."), and Otter Tail Power Co.
v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,373 (1973) (approving the Federal Power Commission's
application, in ordering interconnection to electric facilities, of the standard of "neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest."). For a general discussion of the essential
facilities doctrine, see Monroe E. Price and Mark S. Nadel, Antitrust Issues in the New
Video Medium, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & Er. L.J. 27, 47-49 (1984).
168. Essential Facilities, supra note 167, at 852.
169. Exceptions to the notion of cable dominance in the first relevant product mar-
ket are telcos that received rural or other waivers from the FCC to provide cable
services in their voice service area. In this case, telcos are actually acting as both
telcos and cable companies within their local service areas.
170. Video Programming Assessment, supra note 125, at *182-83.
171. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 124, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess., at § 2(a)(3) (1992).. The full
quote from the report stated that:
There has been a substantial increase in the penetration of cable television
.systems over the past decade. Nearly 56,000,000 households, over 60 percent
of the households with televisions, subscribe to cable television, and this per-
centage is almost certain to increase. As a result of this growth, the cable
television industry has become a dominant nationwide video medium. Cita-
tion omitted. The inference from this analysis is that the 40 percent of
households with television that do not subscribe to cable television are con-
sumers of broadcast television.
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More recently, the FCC reported that nearly sixty-two percent of
all households that could receive basic cable in 1993 purchased
such services. 172 Such penetration levels supported Congress' in-
ference that "cable television industry has become a dominant na-
tionwide video medium.' 173
Finally, in Turner Broadcasting, the Supreme Court observed
that cable networks own an "essential pathway for cable
speech.' 74 Ownership of the "physical connection," i.e., the cable
wiring into consumers' homes, gives the cable operator "bottleneck
... control over most of the television programming that is chan-
neled into the subscriber's home.' 175 This enables the cable opera-
tor to block out competitors easily, "with a mere flick of the
switch.?' 1 76
Thus, in the noninteractive relevant product market, the cable
companies-not the telcos-dominate.
2. Interactive Video Programming Transmission
The relevant product market of interactive video programming
transmission is the market in which concerns about telcos' bottle-
neck control arise. Specifically, telcos' switching and billing exper-
tise may constitute essential facilities in the context of this
interactive relevant product market. 77 This finding is explained
and substantiated in an analysis that progresses through the three
steps of Areeda's essential facilities test.
The first factor in Areeda's test 78 for essential facilities queries
whether the facilities in question are necessary. To provide interac-
tive communications, it is quite likely that telcos' switching and
billing facilities are necessary. First, through switching telcos have
the capacity to provide customized connections. According to
well-known advertisements, telcos are masters at allowing people
172. Video Programming Assessment, supra note 125, at *14-15 (citation omitted).
173. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 124, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess., at § 2(a)(3) (1992).
174. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2466.
175. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2466.
176. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2466 (quoting ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECH-
NOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 168 (1983) ("The central dilemma of cable is that it has un-
limited capacity to accommodate as much diversity and as many publishers as print,
yet all of the producers and publishers use the same physical plant .... If the cable
system is itself a publisher, it may restrict the circumstances under which it allows
others also to use its system.")).
177. This conclusion includes the disputable assumption that the telephone system
will either be wired with fiber optics or include new technologies that will allow deliv-
ery of interactive video programming.
178. See supra text accompanying note 168.
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to "reach out and touch someone," which means that they can se-
lect, from among millions of telephone service recipients, the spe-
cific individuals who wish to interact. While these services are
limited mostly to the provision of voice services, telcos are already
developing expertise in the field of interactive video as a result of
the Video Dialtone Order. 17 9 Second, telcos may have essential fa-
cilities in the interactive market on account of their expertise in
providing customized billing for their customized services. s°
Telcos know how to bill millions of people individually, for transac-
tions as small as a few cents.' 81
Acknowledgement of the necessity of telcos' switching and bill-
ing facilities is derived from several sources, including FCC Com-
missioner Andrew Barrett, the Bell Atlantic Corporation, Judge
Greene and former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Wil-
liam Baxter III. First, FCC Commissioner Barrett has stated that
the technology superhighway has two building blocks: switching
and programming.8 2 In 1993, Barrett observed that one of the rea-
sons that Time Warner Communications was aligning itself with US
West was "to draw upon US West's expertise in building and man-
aging two-way switched networks."'8 3 More generally, Barrett as-
serted that one of the purposes of recent cable-telco alliances is to
provide both partners with "expertise in operating a highly relia-
ble, switched network and a complex billing system .... ,,81 Fi-
nally, Barrett reported that "[c]able companies need access to
switching and network capabilities," yet "they have little experi-
179. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 49.
180. But see Detariffing of Billing and Collection Services, 102 F.C.C.2d 1150
(1986). In this Report and Order, the FCC found that billing was a "financial and
administrative service," and not a common carrier service that would subject telcos to
regulation under Title II of the Communications Act. Id. at 30-32.
The assertion that telcos' billing facilities are essential may also be challenged by
considering the competitive potential of electric companies. Similar to telcos, electric
companies also bill all residents in a local community individually based on amount of
their use of their service. If telcos' competitors were unable to develop their own
billing systems, they could potentially deal with electric companies, rather than being
forced to deal with telcos.
181. Mitch Betts, Tune In, Turn On, Get Rich?: IS Executives Are Building And
Looking To Exploit The Techno-infrastructure For Future Interactive TV Services,
COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 25, 1993, at 102. The corporate vice president for advanced
information technology at Telecommunications, Inc. (TCI), Sadie Decker, observed
that the astronomical number of variables in interactive TV would require a total
rethinking of the concept of billing. Id.
182. Andrew C. Barrett, Shifting Foundations: The Regulation of Telecommunica-
tions in an Era of Change, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 39, 45 (Dec. 1993).
183. Barrett, supra note 182, at 46 (citation omitted).
184. Barrett, supra note 182, at 49.
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ence in switched communications networks." 185 Barrett's state-
ments clearly place a high premium on telcos' switching and billing
expertise, and indicate that this expertise is a significant factor driv-
ing cable companies to engage in joint ventures or mergers with
domestic and international telcos.186
Perhaps unwittingly, Bell Atlantic, C & P's parent company, also
acknowledged the significance of its switching expertise. Conclud-
ing its brief submitted to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
the C & P case, Bell Atlantic argued that excluding telcos from the
video programming market would "deny [a telco] the ability to
provide the unique types of programming that the telephone com-
pany could supply over its own network, such as movies on de-
mand.""" As Bell Atlantic has no expertise in programming, the
only way it could fulfill this promise of delivering "unique" pro-
gramming is to rely on areas where it does have special expertise,
such as switching and billing.
In fact, Bell Atlantic has provided a tangible example of how it
will leverage its switching and billing expertise to provide unique
programming. Along with two other RBOCs (Nynex Corporation
and Pacific Telesis Group), Bell Atlantic is building a new digital
video production center." ' The chief executive of Bell Atlantic
Video Services, Stuart Johnson, stated that the company's "charter
is to offer a differentiated product that will allow [it] to compete
with the cable industry." 89 The RBOCs' new $200 million plant
will depend significantly on switching and billing expertise in order
185. Barrett, supra note 182, at 49.
186. See, e.g., Video Programming Assessment, supra note 125, at *97 n.305. "For
example, within the past year: Southwestern Bell acquired two operating cable sys-
tems in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area from Hauser Communications; US
West purchased several cable systems in the Atlanta, Georgia area; and BellSouth
entered into an agreement to acquire a 22.5% interest in Prime Cable .... ." Id.
(citation omitted).
187. Brief for Appellees at 74, C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985 (4th Cir. Nov.
21, 1994) (Nos. 93-2340, 93-2341) (citation omitted)(emphasis added).
The pay-per-view systems currently available are also sometimes called "movies-
on-demand," and do not require interactive services. Bell Atlantic was probably not
referring to these services. As cable companies currently offer pay-per-view services,
this clearly is not a "unique" type of programming.
188. Edmund L. Andrews, A Launching Pad for a Video Revolution, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 1994, at D1 [hereinafter Launching Pad]. Supporting the concerns underlying
this Note, the purpose of this elaborate video-production center is to provide "more
customized entertainment and shopping," not necessarily to provide an avenue for
consumers to place their own content on the information highway. Id. at D1.
189. Launching Pad, supra note 188.
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to deliver a "differentiated product."'19 This product will be cre-
ated by combining the expertise of the three RBOCs, including
Bell Atlantic's new navigational software to supply video-on-de-
mand, Pacific Telesis' prototype navigational software and Nynex's
transmission technology. 191 Thus, the joint venturers will combine
their expertise in allowing consumers to navigate between choices
to select the individual with whom they wish to communicate. As a
result of this powerful combination, the dominant product of this
joint venture, movies-on-demand, may be delivered as soon as 1997
or 1998.192
Another acknowledgement of the centrality of telcos' facilities in
the relevant product market of interactive video programming
transmission services was provided by Judge Greene during his
1988 periodic review of the modified final judgment decree (MFJ)
that broke up AT&T. In the 1988 review, Judge Greene said that
independent audiotext providers had reported that the RBOCs
were making their billing and switching services inconvenient. 93
These activities resembled AT&T's behavior toward MCI Telecom-
munications Corporation before the break-up.194 In his words,
"even after the break-up of that System, [the RBOCs] have been
engaging in these practices to the extent that they have been per-
mitted into markets that offered opportunities therefor."'95 Three
years later in a 1991 decision, Judge Greene revealed'his belief that
190. For example, the plant will use ATM technology, supra part IV.A.1., to switch
large amounts of digital video programming. According to Dan McWhorter, Bell At-
lantic's Assistant Vice President-Program Management, "ATM-based video transport
and switching systems today [will] allow Bell Atlantic to plan for a technical trial in
1995 and full service rollout by 1996" that will provide true interactivity for end users.
Alan Stewart, Bell Atlantic' Gambles On Video On Demand, AMERICA'S NETWORK,
Sept. 15, 1994, at 28.
Admittedly, Bell Atlantic will purchase ATM and other technologies from outside
vendors, who could also sell to competitors. RBOCs, however, currently retain a con-
siderable advantage: the ability to combine all of the necessary elements in order to
provide interactive programming in the near future. This advantage is illustrated by
the fact that three RBOCs-not cable companies or other information highway com-
panies-have elected to create a joint venture to combine their specialized expertise.
191. Nynex, Bell Atlantic and Pacific Telesis Plunge Into Video Programming, COM-
MON CARRIER WEEK, Nov. 7, 1994, at No. 44, Vol. 11 [hereinafter COMMON CARRIER
WEEK].
192. COMMON CARRIER WEEK, supra note 191.
193. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. at 323 (citing Larson Aff. at 8-10, regarding
conduct of US West; Stabley Aff. at 5-6, regarding conduct of Bell Atlantic). For
description of AT&T's anticompetitive activities in the original decree, see AT&T,
552 F. Supp. at 223.
194. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. at 323.
195. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. at 323.
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the RBOCs were operating essential facilities, which included their
switches. Essential facilities are, explained Judge Greene, a type of
entry barrier that provides the controller of the facility with the
power to exclude competition. 196 According to Greene, the
RBOCs would not hesitate to use their control over essential facili-
ties' 97 to exclude competition, if allowed.198 In his words, the
source of the RBOCs' power was their "complete domination over
... the local wires and switches without which few, if any, competi-
tors can reach the ultimate consumers .... "199
Also, the FCC has noted the importance of the RBOCs' switch-
ing and billing facilities in its Open Network Architecture (ONA)
Order. 2°° This Order, which has been, amended to account for
more realistic assessments of current technology,201 required the
RBOCs to provide access for competitors to basic network capabil-
ities that would be useful in enhanced service applications.20 2 In its
original ONA Order, the FCC specifically mandated access to sig-
196. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. at 314 nn. 29 (citing Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 377;
United States v. Terminal R. Ass'n., 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
187 U.S. App. D.C. 73, 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
197. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. at 314.
198. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. at 315 n. 29-33.
199. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. at 314.
200. Amendment of Sect. 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations, 104
F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (Computer III), modified on reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035
(1987), aff'd on further reconsideration, 3 F.C.C.R. 1135 (1988), modified on reconsid-
eration, 3 F.C.C.R. 1150 (1988), further reconsideration, 4 F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989), rev'd
and vacated, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) (vacating Third Com-
puter Inquiry and remanding to the FCC), further reconsideration, 5 F.C.C.R. 5242
(1990) (FCC proposing to reinstate Third Computer Inquiry non-structural safe-
guards), vacated in part and remanded in part, California v. FCC, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 29001 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 1994) [hereinafter Open Network Architecture
Order].
201. See California v. FCC, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 29001, at *28 (9th Cir. Oct. 18,
1994) (California III). In reviewing the history of the FCC's efforts to require un-
bundling of services through the Open Network ArchitectureOrder, supra note 200,
the Ninth Circuit stated:
[i]n a companion order to the Order on Remand, the FCC conditionally ap-
proved ONA plans filed by the BOCs. In this order, as in the ONA orders
reviewed in California II, the FCC reaffirmed its view that ONA will be an
evolutionary process. In line with this policy shift, the approved ONA plans
do not offer full deployment of ONA services and are not based on new
technology. In the Order on Remand, the FCC recognized that it no longer
requires fundamental unbundling of the BOC networks as a precondition to
lifting structural separation. Id. at *28 (citing Computer III Remand Pro-
ceedings: Bell Operating Company Safeguards and Tier 1 Local Exchange
Company Safeguards, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571, 76000-01 (1991)). Thus, the FCC
now views ONA as evolutionary and does not require unbundling of all
services.
202. Open Network Architecture Order, supra note 200, at 1040, 1064.
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naling, switching, billing and network management facilities. 203
This clearly demonstrated the FCC's concern about telcos' control
over switching and billing facilities.
Perhaps the most convincing statement regarding the potential
for the RBOCs to act anticompetitively by leveraging power de-
rived from possessing unique switching facilities was made recently
by former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust William Bax-
ter III. Testifying before Congress, Baxter stated that "[ilt is inher-
ently anticompetitive to allow a regulated monopoly that controls
local telephone switching services also to be a player in an adjacent
market, such as long distance, that is dependent upon those switch-
ing services." 2°4 "Interactive video programming" may be substi-
tuted for "long distance" in this sentence, because both services
may be dependent on switching. Thus, even Baxter-who was in
office during the break-up of AT&T and is an important member
of the school of antitrust theory that usually trusts businesses to
organize suitably competitive arrangements2' 5-acknowledges the
monopolistic characteristics of telcos' switching facilities.
Having offered evidence from various sources regarding the ne-
cessity of access to telcos' switching and billing facilities in order to
promote competition, it is now appropriate to address the second
step of Areeda's essential facilities test: the availability of duplica-
tive facilities or practical alternatives.' Currently, duplicate facili-
ties for local switched services, including voice or perhaps video in
the future, are not available. 207 Duplicating the facilities required
to provide switched local services is expensive, perhaps as costly as
$50 per line, per month.208 As the current average price of local
telephone service is around $14 per month, would-be competitors
might find it prohibitively expensive to build duplicate switched
203. Open Network Architecture Order, supra note 200, at 1040.
204. The Communications Act of 1994: Hearings on S. 1822 Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Monopolies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of William Baxter III, former Asst. Atty. Gen.
for Antitrust) [hereinafter Baxter Testimony] (emphasis added).
205. See infra parts V.C.1.
206. See supra text accompanying note 168.
207. The Communications Act of 1994: Hearing on S. 1822 Before the Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 12, 1994) (state-
ment of Bert C. Roberts, Jr., Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer of MCI Communica-
tions Corp.) (quoting The Enduring Local Bottleneck, a study by Economics and
Technology, Inc.) ("'The easiest way to prove there is no competition is to observe
that there is no place in the country today where a consumer has a choice of local
carriers for local telephone service.' ").
208. John S. Harrison, The Information Superhighway, FoRNicrrmy, at 38.
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telephone networks.209 Duplication may be feasible only for serv-
ices that promise higher rates of return, such as niche services or
basic telephone services in densely population areas with lower per
capita costs.
2 10
Of particular relevance to this discussion of the cable-telco cross-
ownership ban, present cable systems are not practical alternatives
to local telephone systems. Cable companies that lack the
equivalent to telcos $51-billion switching architecture, as well as
technical knowledge and experience providing voice communica-
tions, might have difficulty duplicating telcos' networks.211 Cable
companies' efforts to duplicate the fiber and switching facilities, as
well as the network and management functions, has been called
6"an enormous financial undertaking which will take many years to
complete. 2 12 Currently, the promised two-way digital cable sys-
tems offering telecommunications are not yet fully viable, as they
are only in trial stages. 213
Other commentators believe that installing duplicative switching
facilities may entail an unnecessary waste of resources.214 For in-
209. Harrison, supra note 208.
210. Harrison, supra note 208.
211. Harrison, supra note 208.
212. The Antitrust and Communications Reform Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 3636
Before the Subcomm. on Economics and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 2, 1994) (statement of John D. Zeglis, Senior
Vice Pres.-Gen. Counsel & Govt. Affairs for AT&T) [hereinafter Zeglis] testimony.
Admittedly, as Senior Vice President-General Counsel and Government Affairs for
AT&T, which views the RBOCs' attempts to gain permission to provide long distance
services as threatening, Zeglis might be motivated to exaggerate the power of the
RBOCs.
213. Zeglis, testimony supra note 212. Zeglis observed that "Cable networks are
essentially one-way broadcast networks designed to distribute a signal from a cable
network 'head-end' to all locations on the network. Cable networks will have to be
transformed from these one-way analog distribution networks to networks that can
supply two-way switched communications." Id.
214. In addition to duplicating the switching facilities, duplicating the network for
delivering voice services may also be prohibitively expensive. Video Programming
Assessment, supra note 125, at *179-82 (discussing conflicting views regarding the
economy of deploying fiber to the curb or the home). "Leland Johnson suggests that
the cost of rebuilding an existing cable system with fiber to the neighborhood is in the
range of $250 to $300 per subscriber, whereas upgrading a system with fiber to the
curb in order to provide a combination of telephon[e] and video service[s], increases
the cost dramatically to approximately $1,242 per home passed, comparable to the
cost of a [telcoJ-provided integrated network of $1,150 per subscriber." Id. at *180
n.522 (citing LELAND L. JOHNSON, TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVISION 32
(1994)).
Although the FCC reported that commentators have different opinions regarding
the economic feasibility of deploying a fiber network that can support both voice and
video programming, in some areas cable companies have already installed fiber net-
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXII
stance, in an article about antitrust law and the information high-
way, commentator John Stevens observed that local telcos may
have natural monopolies on account of their switching equipment.
In his words; "[liocal telephone exchanges probably constitute nat-
ural monopolies due to economies of scale in the areas of switching
costs and network design and management."' 215 Interestingly, Ste-
vens supported this assertion by describing the case of metropoli-
tan access networks, which bypass local telcos in order to provide
216o-connections for long-distance telephone service. Stevens ob
served that metropolitan access networks have been limited to pro-
viding non-switched, dedicated transmission lines. The significance
of switching facilities is particularly demonstrated by the fact that,
instead of installing their own switching facilities, one metropolitan
access network petitioned the FCC and the DOJ in order to force
the RBOCs to provide access to their switching facilities.217 In
other words, the competitor seeking access considered the facilities
to be too expensive to duplicate easily. Thus, the facilities were
considered essential for competition, which is the second step of
Areeda's test.21
Finally, the third element of Areeda's essential facilities test ana-
lyzes whether a potential entrant would be essential for competi-
tion.219 To evaluate this element, it is necessary to consider
whether telcos face significant competition in most markets. Testi-
fying before Congress in the fall of 1994, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Antitrust Anne Bingaman discussed "the lock that the
local monopolies of the Bell System, the Bell Operating Compa-
works. In this regard, the FCC reports, "[t]he installation of fiber in cable systems has
grown from close to zero:in 1988, to over 24,000 miles by 1992. ... The cable televi-
sion industry's rate of fiber deployment doubled between 1991 and 1992, and in 1993,
over 25% of wired cable subscribers were served by systems employing fiber optics."
Id. at *180 (citations omitted).
215. John M. Stevens, Antitrust Law and Open Access to the NREN, 38 VILL. L.
REV. 571, 594 n.101 (1993). Note, however, that Stevens' statement may be chal-
lenged in areas where cable companies have already installed fiber optic wiring. See
supra note 214.
216. Stevens, supra note 215, at 594 n.101 (citing Charles Siler, How to Bypass Your
Friendly Phone Company, FORBES, Aug. 21, 1989, at 89).
217. Stevens, supra note 215, at 594 n.101 (citing Royce J. Holland, Competitive
Local Communications: The New Landscape, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Feb. 1992, at
23).' See also Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities
Amendment of Part 36 of -the Commission's. Rules and Establishment of a Joint
Board, 8 F.C.C.R. 7374 (1993) (ordering telcos to increase opportunities to intercon-
nect with their switched transport services).
218. See supra text accompanying note 168.
219. See supra text accompanying note 168.
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nies (BOCs), still have on local telephone service (carrying more
than 99% of local traffic in their service areas). ' 220 According to
this authoritative report, telcos-at least the RBOCs-face little
or no competition for local switched services. Therefore, under the
third element of the essential facilities test, any entrant would be
essential to promote competition in switching in local markets.
Thus, the conclusion derived from considering the three ele-
ments of Areeda's essential facilities test as applied in the interac-
tive relevant product market is that telcos (or at least the RBOCs)
may indeed possess essential facilities.2 1 To summarize, telcos' es-
sential facilities are their switching and billing infrastructure be-
cause (i) without switching facilities and billing expertise a
potential entrant to the interactive video programming transport
market cannot compete effectively, (ii) a practical alternative to
switching and billing may be unavailable or duplication may be
prohibitively expensive, and (iii) potential entrants in the interac-
tive video programming transport market would be essential for
competition.
Of course, in the future telcos' facilities may cease to be charac-
terized as "essential." For instance, telcos' facilities will no longer
be essential if wireless cable proves effective for interactive digital
communications or the cable companies implement fully operative
switched networks. Until such time, however, telcos' facilities can
be labeled "essential."
V. Recommendations
This Note proposes three recommendations regarding the C & P
case. First, more attention should be paid to the relevant product
market of interactive video programming transmission, which
promises to support the best applications for the information
highway.
Second, C & P and cases modeled on it 222 should be reversed
because the courts that already decided these cases failed to focus
on the interactive product market. More generally, judges should
220. The Communications Act of 1994: Hearing on S. 1822 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Business Rights, and Monopolies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Anne K. Bingaman, Asst. Atty.
Gen. for the Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice) [hereinafter Bingaman Testimony].
221. Note that this conclusion assumes that telcos will install the fiber optic wiring
or develop new technologies that will enable them to transport interactive .video pro-
gramming over their switched system.
222. See supra notes 4-8.
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not legislate from the bench, especially in this complicated area of
telecommunications reform.
Third, the reason the courts have found that § 533(b) is not nar-
rowly tailored is that regulators are imposing industry-specific reg-
ulations, rather than relying on enforcement of the generally-
applicable antitrust laws. This situation has arisen because, in the
current era of more lenient antitrust enforcement, antitrust and
First Amendment law are no longer pursuing harmonious goals.
The risk of failing First Amendment review could be avoided by
reinvigorating application of the generally-applicable antitrust laws
in the marketplace of ideas.
A. Emphasize Interactive Video Programming Transmission
The public interest will be advanced by selecting the relevant
product market that encapsulates a vision of the best potential uses
of the information highway. To achieve this goal, the relevant
product market should be based on an ideal consumer of interac-
tive, rather than noninteractive, information highway services. 223
The public interest will be served because interactivity will inspire
active interchange of ideas and community-building in cyberspace,
rather than passive, introverted consumption of movies and home-
shopping. Only the relevant product market that includes interac-
tivity can fully support public interest activities, such as democracy,
interest-based communities, telemedicine and distance learning.
These are the types of activities that will challenge consumers to
explore and realize the full potential of this incredible new market-
place, the information highway.
As noted above, in the relevant product market of interactive
video programming transmission services, telcos may have a com-
petitive advantage because of their switching and billing infrastruc-
223. Interestingly, selecting the relevant product market based on the notion of an
ideal consumer does not contradict the principles of Professional Engineers, 435 U.S.
at 695; which states that "the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question
whether competition is good or bad." See also FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990) ("The social justifications proffered for respondents'
restraint of trade thus do not make it any less unlawful."). In Professional Engineers,
the Supreme Court stated that antitrust laws should not be applied to further public
policy objectives directly. Instead, antitrust laws should concentrate on enforcing
competition, which is the surest method for producing outcomes, such as better goods
and services, that serve the public interest. Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 694-95.
The antitrust analysis in this Note obeys the proviso of Professional Engineers. In-
stead of introducing public interest arguments into the application of the antitrust
laws, the public interest is advanced through the selection of relevant product market.
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ture and expertise.224 Telcos may leverage this power to discourage
competition from independent companies and individuals seeking
to provide content for the information highway.
To explain, if telcos are allowed to provide their own video pro-
gramming over their own facilities, they will be able to charge for
both transmission and content, e.g., video programming. The pros-
pect of profits from video programming might provide telcos with
incentives to discriminate against other content providers. In par-
ticular, telcos may not be willing to transmit content for competing
providers, such as individual computer bulletin board system oper-
ators and users. These low budget providers may lure customers
away from purchasing products, such as video programming, from
telcos' affiliates. One commentator has observed: "There's tons of
valuable business information available on the Internet. Charging
higher fees to end users to get that information may push out a lot
of the 'cyber-surfers' who are just looking for fun, personal stuff.
There's a definite business aspect, now that there's a profit
angle.,225
Striking down the cross-ownership ban may indeed promote de-
velopment and competition in the noninteractive video program-
ming transmission market, which includes entertainment and
home-shopping. Unfortunately, this competition may be achieved
at a dear price: reduced opportunities for competition from in-
dependent content providers seeking to promote interactive uses
of the information highway. Particularly as interactiye uses may
better serve the public interest, ignoring the dangers of telcos' pos-
sible anticompetitive practices in this arena would be a short-
sighted way to promote the growth of the information highway.
Thus, before liberating telcos from cross-ownership restrictions,
government officials, judges and other concerned individuals
should thoroughly study the competitive position of telcos in the
interactive relevant product market.
224. See supra part IV.B.2.
225. Internet Privatization Opens Fast Lanes for Telcos on the I-Way, TELCO Busi-
NESS REPORT, Nov. 21, 1994, at No. 23, Vol. 11 (quoting Bob Barbour). Bob Barbour
is a spokesman for Metropolitan Fiber Systems, which is providing a network access
point to the Internet. MFS Datanet is one of several companies assuming some of the
National Science Foundation's management responsibilities for gateways to the
Internet.
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1. Current Status of the Proposed Solution to Emphasize
Interactive Video Programming Transmission
Arguably, the C & P courts reached their holdings about the rea-
sonableness of § 533(b) by considering the statute's impact only on
the relevant product market for noninteractive video programming
transmission. 226 For instance, the circuit court discussed the stat-
ute's role in barring telcos from entering the "cable television mar-ket" and transmitting "video programming via cable
television. 227
Similarly, the C & P district court focused on the noninteractive
relevant product market. This premise is supported by the district
court's discussion of broadcasting cases, such as Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC.228 Further, the C & P district court indicated
that the case concerned "cable transmission systems" consisting of
"multiple lines of coaxial cable or fiber optics."229 The compari-
sons with broadcasting and cable systems indicate that the district
court was concerned with only the market for one-way communica-
tions, i.e., the noninteractive relevant product market.
The C & P courts are not the only important decisionmakers
who have focused on noninteractive, as opposed to interactive,
video programming transmission. Significantly, in reregulating the
cable industry in the 1992 Cable Act, Congress predicated its ac-
tions on noninteractive video programming transmission. This is
illustrated by the fact that the goal of the legislation was to pro-
mote competition from technologies, such as wireless cable, that
transmit video programming one-way, but do not aim to support
interactivity at the present time. 30 The focus on noninteractive
products is further illustrated by one of the main goals of the 1992
Cable Act: hindering video programming suppliers' favoritism of
certain cable companies, in order to ensure access to the diversity
226. See supra part IV.B.1.
227. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *69.
228. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (regulation requiring broadcasters to provide time for re-
plies to personal attacks, under the Fairness Doctrine, upheld as constitutional be-
cause of the scarcity of broadcast channels).
229. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 919 n.14 (quoting Joint Stipulations of Fact, 40).
230. Assistant Secretary of Commerce Larry Irving, who is currently the Clinton
Administration's top teleconmtmnications policy person, previously was a senior attor-
ney on the subcommittee that produced the 1992 Cable Act. He has explained that
"[wihat we tried to do with that bill was create consumer protection and then move to
a competitive model where you have more than one cable company or cable compet-
ing in satellites or cable competing in some microwave services." Technopolitics (PBS
television broadcast, Sept. 17, 1993).
For a general discussion of the technology involved, see supra part IV.A.1.
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of programming required for effective competition for wireless
cable providers.231
In contrast, the relevant product market of interactive transmis-
sion, albeit not necessarily video programming transmission, was
the predicate for Judge Greene's decisions. For instance, in a 1991
decision, Judge Greene had to decide whether telcos should be al-
lowed into the information services market. In that case, Judge
Greene clearly indicated that he would not include wireless serv-
ices in the relevant product market for information services. Spe-
cifically, he stated that "[the evidence also demonstrates that non-
telephone-based services are not substitutes for the information
transmitted over the telephone network. ' 232 The reason services
like wireless cable cannot be substituted for telephone connections
is that "only the [hardwired] telecommunications network can offer
two-way interaction with up-to-the-minute information databases
accessible by a large customer base, including occasional users. "233
B. The Courts' Holdings in C & P
As discussed above, it is important to appreciate the distinction
between facilities used to -transmit interactive, as opposed to
noninteractive, video programming. Therefore, decisionmakers in
this complicated area of telecommunications reform should be in
command of the facts. Historically, the branch of government en-
trusted with studying facts has been Congress. Understanding the
relationship between research and legislation, the judiciary is usu-
ally deferential to Congress.
231. Video programming suppliers may be easily influenced in their dealings with
cable companies that either occupy a very large market share, like Telecommunica-
tions, Inc., or have an ownership interest in the supplier. Responding to this situation
and hoping to encourage competition from wireless cable, Congress enacted § 19 of
the 1992 Cable Act. This section requires video programming suppliers to make their
wares available to distributors using MMDS and DBS. See 138 CONG. REC. 8317
(daily ed. Sept. 14, 1992) (adding a new section to Part III of Title VI of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934).
Speaking on the House floor in support of the conference report, Rep. Mike Synar
(D-Okla.) stated that "in a rural district ... many .. constituents rely on satellite
dishes for their television programming. Right now some cable programmers refuse
to even sell programming to home satellite dish distributors' and those that do[,]
charge the distributors an average of 500-percent more than they charge cable opera-
tors .... ." 138 CONG. REC. 8672 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1992). See also 138 CONG. REC.
8675-76 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1992) (statement by Rep. Slattery).
232. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. at 315 (citing Sinback Aff. 5-12).
233. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. at 315 (citing Huber Report, submitted by
DOJ during triennial review proceedings, at 6.23).
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This tradition of deference of Congress was not evident in the C
& P decisions, however. Admittedly, the courts mentioned the im-
portance of deferring to Congress; they did not, however, act on
their own advice. The circuit and district courts erred by overstep-
ping the boundaries of their authority. Even if consensus is build-
ing to repeal the cross-ownership ban, it is the legislature's
prerogative to take this step, not the judiciary's.
In Turner Broadcasting, the Supreme Court instructed that
courts have an obligation to exercise independent judgment when
First Amendment rights are implicated, in order to ensure that
Congress has drawn "reasonable inferences based on substantial
evidence. ' 234 Yet, the Supreme Court cautioned that this obliga-
tion is "not a license to reweigh the evidence de novo, or to replace
Congress' factual predictions with [the court's] own. '235 In striking
down § 533(b), the cross-ownership ban, because it was not nar-
rowly tailored, the C & P courts effectively reweighed the evidence
of the potential for telcos' anticompetitive behavior. In fact, the
district court acknowledged that it was "undertak[ing] its own re-
view of the record to determine whether Congress 'reasonably
could have' found that a prophylactic ban was necessary to effec-
tively accomplish Congress' purposes. "236
The courts in C & P acted appropriately in reviewing the reason-
ableness of Congress' adoption of § 533(b) as the least restrictive
alternative. The courts also may have found correctly that there is
"an entire range of effective alternatives that would burden sub-
stantially less speech than § 533(b)." 7 The courts, however, acted
inappropriately in deviating from the proviso set forth by the
Supreme Court in Ward that a regulation should be found constitu-
tional " 'so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial gov-
ernment interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation.' ",238 The instruction from Ward is addressed specifi-
cally to situations where effective alternatives exist, and should
prevent a court from interfering in the legislative process as long as
there is a reasonable justification for the disputed regulation.
234. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2471 (citing Century Communications Corp.
v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). See also supra part III.C.
235. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2471.
236. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 929 (citing San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 539 (1987)).
237. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *66, and C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 931
n.33 (comparing with Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689).
238. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quot-
ing Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689)). See supra part III.B.
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Admittedly, many legislators and commentators believe that the
cross-ownership ban is no longer a beneficial regulation. 239 In fact,
in 1994, telecommunications reform legislation that would have re-
pealed the cross-ownership ban easily passed in both the House of
Representatives 2 ° and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation. 241 The Clinton Administration also fa-
vored repeal, as illustrated by statements made by the head of the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
Larry Irving. For instance, speaking at a hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, Irving stated
that "[w]e believe that telephone companies should be allowed to
provide video services in their local exchange areas, subject to ef-
fective safeguards to protect consumers and competition. 242
Even if it is desirable to repeal the cross-ownership ban, how-
ever, this does not mean that Congress acted unreasonably when it
included § 533(b) in the 1984 Cable Act and did not repeal the
statute in the 1992 Cable Act. For instance, as discussed in detail
above, telcos' switching and billing infrastructures might be charac-
terized as essential facilities that should be regulated in order to
promote competition.243 Further, telcos may successfully engage in
the anticompetitive practice of tying purchases of their video pro-
gramming to the provision of voice or video transmission serv-
ices.2' Also, persuasive authorities maintain that the FCC may not
239. See, e.g., statement by REPRESENTATIVE DINGELL, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE, REPORT ON NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION AND IN-
FORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE ACT OF 1994, H.R. REP. No. 3636, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 43-49 (1994).
240. H.R. 3636, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
241. S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
242. Hearing on H.R. 3636 Legislation Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunica-
tions and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994) (statement of Larry Irving, Asst. Secretary for Communications and In-
formation, U.S. Dep't of Commerce).
243. See supra part IV.B.2.
244. Tying is present when vendors leverage power in one market to force consum-
ers to purchase products in an adjacent market. The Supreme Court has loosely de-
fined leverage "as a supplier's power to induce his customer for one product to buy a
second product from him that would not otherwise be purchased solely on the merit
of the second product." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14
n.20 (1984) (citing PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
1134a, at 202 (1980) [hereinafter AREEDA & TURNER]).
The concern is that, once telcos are permitted to supply video programming, they
might use their control over the supply of local voice services to force consumers to
purchase their video programming or other products, such as data services. See Bin-
gaman Testimony, supra note 220. Bingaman discussed "the lock that the local mo-
nopolies of the Bell System, the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs), still have on local
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be capable of adequately monitoring and preventing cross-subsidi-
zation.245 Consequently, the C & P courts should have found Con-
gress' actions regarding the cross-ownership ban to be reasonable,
and should have upheld the statute under the First Amendment.
Instead, the courts assumed responsibility for evaluating the alter-
natives to § 533(b). For example, the district court seemed to favor
a recent FCC recommendation to limit telcos' direct provision of
video programming to a specified percentage of channel capac-
ity.246 Rather than recognizing that the district court was attempt-
ing to legislate from the bench, the circuit court agreed with
District Judge Ellis' legislative proposal.247
Such evaluation of regulatory alternatives is a classic example of
a responsibility that has traditionally been allocated to the legisla-
tive branch of government. Even the Supreme Court, addressing a
communications regulation (the must-carry rule) in Turner Broad-
casting, gave the government an opportunity to provide more de-
tailed facts.248 The Supreme Court remanded the case, requiring
proof that the government's remedy (the regulation) did not bur-
den substantially more speech than necessary to further the gov-
ernment's legitimate interests.249 The Supreme Court stated that
telephone service .... " Id. This "lock" could provide the RBOCs with leverage
sufficient to engage in tying.
245. Cross-subsidization occurs when a firm shifts costs from production in a com-
petitive market into production in a monopoly market. In his affidavit submitted to
the C & P district court, Alfred Kahn, an economist and professor emeritus at Cornell
University, stated that "the danger of cross-subsidization typically arises in situations
in which significant portions of the costs of competitive and monopoly services are
common to both." Kahn Aff. at 6, C & P, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993). There
is a risk of cross-subsidization if telcos are allowed to provide video programming
because both voice services and video programming transmission could be supported
by the same facilities.
The issue of the FCC's capacity to monitor and prevent cross-subsidization by
telcos is a continuing subject of debate. For instance, former Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Antitrust Baxter recently testified that, despite the good intentions and efforts
of the FCC, "[r]egulation is inherently incapable of ferreting out the subtle means of
... cross-subsidization that a monopolist can employ." Baxter Testimony, supra note
204.
Significantly, however, the FCC has attempted to address these concerns through
two new safeguards: price caps and strengthened accounting rules. Price Cap Per-
formance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, 9 F.C.C.R. 1687 (1994) (Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking). The Ninth Circuit recently found that the FCC's new safe-
guards will reduce the RBOCs' incentives and abilities to cross-subsidize. California
III, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 29001, at *20-21.
246. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 930-31.
247. C & P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32985, at *66.
248. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2471-72.
249. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2472 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). As
part of its explanation, the Court noted that "[w]hen the Government defends a regu-
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the lower court needed this evidence in order to judge whether the
* regulation does in fact serve the government's interests,250 and
whether "constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means" ex-
ist.25 1 To assist the court in making these determinations, the gov-
ernment must show that the regulation restricting speech addresses
harms that are "real, not merely conjectural ....
The C & P district court did acknowledge that the executive
branch (represented by the FCC) must make recommendations to
Congress regarding regulatory alternatives, 25 and cannot repeal
the cross-ownership ban on its own. 4 Despite this lip service to
the importance of separation of powers, however, the C & P courts
did not hesitate to legislate from the bench, thereby replacing Con-
gress' factual predictions with their own opinions.
C. Strengthen Antitrust Law Enforcement in the
Telecommunications Industry
Once the C & P courts decided to apply intermediate, as op-
posed to minimal basis, review to § 533(b), it became much more
likely that the statute would be found unconstitutional. 25 The
cross-ownership ban, § 533(b), merited a higher level of review be-
cause, unlike the generally-applicable antitrust law in Associated
Press v. United States,256 it is an industry-specific regulation .257 In-
dustry-specific regulations are more likely to be considered to be
content-based and therefore evaluated-and struck down-under
a higher standard of First Amendment review.
Similarly, Turner Broadcasting characterized the must-carry
rules as industry-specific antitrust legislation.58  The Supreme
lation on speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it
must do more than simply 'posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured.'" Id.
at 2470 (quoting Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
250. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2472 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
251. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2472 (quoting Sable Communications of
Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989)).
252. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470 (citing Los Angeles v. Preferred Com-
munications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 496 (1986) (quotations omitted); other citation
omitted).
253. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 930-31.
254. See supra part III.C.
255. See supra part III.A.
256. 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (First Amendment not implicated when generally-applicable
antitrust laws were applied to news distribution organization, simply because com-
modity of the organization was speech, because, the laws did not aim to or in fact
restrict speech).
257. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2445 (citations omitted).
258. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2455 (citations omitted).
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Court could have made a convincing argument that the must-carry
rules are content-based because, by guaranteeing cable channels to
selected cable programmers or "speakers," the rules are based on
speech.259 Instead, the Court was convinced that, because the reg-
ulation originated with Congress' interest in ensuring access to the
physical means of communication, the must-carry rules were not
content-based regulations that would demand strict scrutiny.260
The risk of intermediate or high tier review could be avoided by
relying instead on the traditional antitrust laws. In general, the ju-
diciary should not insulate media-related companies, including
telcos, from antitrust regulations. The antitrust laws permit the ap-
plication of prophylactic measures to companies engaged in
speech.26' In fact, the C & P district court observed that "[t]he
federal agencies charged with enforcement of the antitrust laws
stand ready to guard against anti-competitive behavior in the video
programming market, just as in any other industry. ' 262 The legisla-
ture should not be prevented from adopting precautionary meas-
ures that it finds, following fact-finding and debate, to be
necessary.
In recent cases, however, regulations affecting the telecommuni-
cations industry, such as § 533(b) in C & P and the must-carry rules
in Turner Broadcasting, have been subjected to First Amendment
challenges. These challenges are at least partially the result of con-
fusion caused by the conflicting goals of antitrust and First Amend-
ment law. Specifically, the goals of First Amendment and antitrust
law, which were aligned when Associated Press was decided in
259. See Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2458 ("Because the must-carry provi-
sions impose special obligations upon cable operators and special burdens upon cable
programmers, some measure of heightened First Amendment scrutiny is
demanded.").
260. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2467-68. See also id. at 2466.
261. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20. The case stated that:
It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for freedom of the
press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a
command that the government was without power to protect that freedom.
The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against application
of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That
Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the wel-
fare of the public, that a free press is a condition of free society. Surely a
command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas
does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose re-
straints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Id.
262. C & P, 830 F. Supp. at 931.
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1945, have diverged with the advent of the Chicago School of anti-
trust theory.
When Associated Press was decided, both First Amendment and
antitrust law sought to encourage the development of a communi-
cations industry consisting of multiple and diverse companies. This
harmony of purpose resulted in cases that provided only rational
basis scrutiny for "legislative efforts to correct market failure in a
market whose commodity is speech." 263 A rational basis for review
was supported: (i) by antitrust laws, on account of the economic
motivation for the regulation at issue, and (ii) by First Amendment
jurisprudence, because courts did not see the need to analyze anti-
trust laws affecting the market for speech under the rubric of the
First Amendment.
Currently, the competitive activities of media enterprises are
more often governed by industry-specific regulations, which are
more vulnerable to First Amendment challenges, than by tradi-
tional antitrust laws. This preference may derive from the changes
in antitrust law enforcement since the AP decision. Specifically,
the trend in antitrust law is to tolerate large conglomerates because
of their claimed efficiencies. 264 Tolerance for larger, vertically inte-
grated enterprises, however, may limit the number of market
participants.
. Significantly, when the commodity at issue is speech, conflict
arises because tolerance of a few large firms may result in limiting
the number of speakers. While antitrust law may tolerate fewer
speakers, First Amendment law favors an accessible "marketplace
of ideas" that is hospitable to small, fringe speakers.265 Thus,
although the two bodies of laws once operated symbiotically to
produce diversity in the marketplace of ideas, now they may con-
flict with each other.
I To limit uncertainties caused by First Amendment challenges to
regulations affecting the communications industry, government
should apply the traditional antitrust laws instead of drafting new
263. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470 (quoting Brief for Federal Appellees at
17, Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. 2445, and citing Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1, and
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951)).
264. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach:
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHi. L. REV. 1 (1977).
265. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470 (citations omitted) ("assuring that the
public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of
the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment. Indeed, it
has long been a basic tenet of national communications policy that "the widest possi-
ble dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to
the welfare of the public.").
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industry-specific regulations, such as § 533(b) or the must-carry
rules considered in Turner Broadcasting.
Government should regulate media companies under the Sher-
man or Clayton Acts,26 which are broadly applicable laws that
cannot be characterized as content-based. Therefore, if the gov-
ernment challenges the structure of a media organization by apply-
ing one of the antitrust laws, it will not be subject to allegations of
regulating speech based on content. The government will thus
avoid the necessity of defending its regulations under strict scrutiny
or the intermediate test, as it was required to do recently in C & P
and Turner Broadcasting.
1. Current Status of the Proposed Solution to Strengthen
Antitrust Law Enforcement in the Telecommunications
Industry
In order for communications law to rely on antitrust rather than
First Amendment law to foster diversity in the media marketplace,
antitrust law enforcement must "go back to the future." Applying
the antitrust laws the way it did prior to the advent of the Chicago
School, the federal government could foster diversity by preventing
one or a few organizations from grasping too much power in the
marketplace. This type of antitrust enforcement would realign the
antitrust laws with the First Amendment, thereby favoring a multi-
plicity of participants in the market for speech.
The traditional antitrust perspective is the structural economic
approach. According to this view, which was followed from the
time of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt until 1980,267 the
structure of an industry determines the level of its performance. If
266. Mark S. Nadel, an Attorney/Advisor in the Common Carrier Bureau of the
FCC, has observed that "[flor most economic markets, common carrier rules or the
'essential facilities doctrine' help eliminate market distortions. In the context of com-
munications, common carrier rules help eliminate distortions in the marketplace of
ideas." Mark S. Nadel, A Technology Transparent Theory of the First Amendment and
Access to Communications Media, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 157, 181 (1991) (citation
omitted).
See also Mark S. Nadel, A Unified Theory of the First Amendment: Divorcing the
Medium from the Message, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163 (1982). "[N]ot only does the
first amendment forbid the imposition of unreasonable regulations on access to fora
controlled directly by the government or by users selected by the government, but [I
the amendment permits, and probably even supports, the imposition of economic reg-
ulations to facilitate access to all media, including privately owned newspapers." Id.
at 191 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
267. Seymour D. Lewis, The Reagan Revolution in Antitrust, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21,
1989, at 1, 9. Lewis was a former special assistant to the Attorney General in the
Antitrust Division.
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only a few firms participate in a given market, the structural school
would consider it likely that the dearth of vigorous competition
would produce higher prices and profits. 26 Antitrust officials
might have to intervene to prompt restructuring of markets domi-
nated by certain firms in order to improve competition, increase
efficiency and promote competitive pricing.
Two classic cases-Brown Shoe Co. v. United States269 and
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank27 0 -illustrate the im-
pact of the structural school on actual cases. In Brown Shoe, the
Supreme Court prohibited, as a violation of the Clayton Act,271 a
merger of two firms accounting for only five percent of the total
industry output. Thus, the Court would not allow the merger to
proceed because the structure of the industry might be harmed by
allowing a five percent concentration of market power. The next
year, in Philadelphia National Bank,272 the Supreme, Court em-
braced the structural. school view once again. The Court invali-
dated a merger between the second and third largest banks that
would have resulted in a single bank with control of thirty percent
of the commercial banking in the Philadelphia metropolitan
area.273 Demonstrating a presumption in favor of preventing the
concentration of market power, the Court stated that mergers must
be enjoined unless there is evidence that the merger would not
have anticompetitive effects.274. Thus, the Court held that any
merger producing a firm with an undue market share and causing a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market
would be prima facie unlawful.275
In contrast to the structural school's emphasis on the effect that
mergers or other activities may have on the structure of, or concen-
tration of power within, the marketplace, the Chicago School is
more concerned with how monopoly power is acquired. Rather
268. Lewis, supra note 267, at 1, 9.
269. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
270. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
271. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1987).
272. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
273. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 364-65.
274. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363 (citing United States v. Koppers Co.,
202 F. Supp. 437 (W.D. Pa. 1962)). "Specifically, we think that a merger which pro-
duces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results
in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market is so inherently
likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of
evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive
effects." Id.
275. Lewis, supra note 267, at 1, col. 2.
259
260 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXII
than seeking to break-up firms with significant market power, the
Chicago School instructs that monopolists who legitimately acquire
and do not abuse their power should be "tolerated but not cher-
ished. '276 Professor Areeda has explained that "the concept of
monopolization requires.., monopoly power coupled not with
building the better mousetrap, but monopoly power coupled with
some impropriety in its achievement or maintenance. ' 277 Under
this theory, antitrust law should focus its regulation on monopoly
power that is willfully acquired or maintained by improper means,
such as excluding rivals. 278
According to the Chicago School, monopoly power stemming
from superior business acumen or historical accident should not be
punished. The Chicago School champions leniency in applying an-
titrust laws in order to allow businesses to shape their own agree-
ments and business structures. Unless clear economic information
demonstrates otherwise, the Chicago School would assume that
"corporate endeavors are procompetitive by necessity." 279 The
Chicago School instructs that in enforcing the antitrust laws, the
courts should be cautious about engaging in extensive theoretical
economic investigations rather than presumptively acting on as-
sumptions about the validity of industrial organization.3 Judge
Frank H. Easterbrook, former faculty member of the University of
Chicago Law School, advised adopting a skeptical approach to an-
titrust enforcement, including questioning whether government has
276. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
When the market will support only one firm, this is a classic case of natural monop-
oly. According to Areeda, if the market will support only one supplier of a given
product, then that monopoly supplier should not be punished for entering first or
becoming the monopolist in the market. Essential Facilities, supra note 167, at 846.
Although natural monopolists should not be punished, their ability to act anticompe-
titively may be increased if they are not disciplined by market forces. It may there-
fore be necessary for the government to regulate a natural monopoly.
277. Essential Facilities, supra note 167, at 846.
278. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274 (quoting Justice Douglas in United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). Justice Douglas' specific words in Grin-
nell, 384 U.S. at 570-71, discussed the "willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident."
279. Barbara Ann White, Countervailing Power-Different Rules for Different Mar-
kets? Conduct and Context in Antitrust Law and Economics, 41 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1064
(1992).
280. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
Rnv. 925, 933-34 (1979). See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADOX
(1978).
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the ability to judge the optimal organization of industries and
markets. 8 1
The effect of the debate between the structural and Chicago
schools on the deregulation of the RBOCs' telecommunications in-
frastructure is illustrated by the differing views of District Judge
Greene and the Court of Appeals that reviews his decisions. In the
years since the break-up of AT&T, Judge Greene has been gradu-
ally deregulating the RBOCs. Continuing this deregulation in
1988, Judge Greene permitted the RBOCs to enter the videotext
services market.28
In the same year, however, Judge Greene did not permit the
RBOCs to enter the information content services market. 283 Judge
Greene distinguished between videotext transmission and informa-
tion content services by observing that the RBOCs' infrastructure
was necessary, or at least most efficient, for distributing videotext
services on an integrated national basis.28 The inference was that
the infrastructure supporting videotext services constituted a mo-
nopoly that should be regulated to ensure access.8 5 Thus, struc-
tural school reasoning guided Judge Greene to deny the large
RBOC firms entrance into the information content market. Spe-
cifically, when Judge Greene refused to lift the information content
ban, he explained that the RBOCs are some of the largest corpora-
tions in the country.2" Quoting a classic case of the pre-Chicago
281. Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, in ANrrrrwsT, INNOVATION,
AND CoMPETrTVENESS 119 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992). "The
hallmark of the Chicago approach to antitrust is skepticism. Doubt that we know the
optimal organization of industries and markets. Doubt that government could use
that knowledge, if it existed, to improve things, given the ubiquitous private adjust-
ments that so often defeat public plans, So that by the time knowledge had been put to
use the world has moved on." Id.
282. In 1988, he permitted the RBOCs to engage in the transmission of information
services, which includes "data transmission, address translation, protocol conversion,
billing management, and introductory information content." The RBOCs were also
permitted to engage in voice messaging and electronic mail services, provided they
did not discriminate against other providers. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 714
F. Supp. 1, 23 (D.D.C. 1988).
283. Western Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. at 1.
284. Western Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. at 6.
285. In contrast to videotext services, Judge Greene found in 1988 that other serv-
ices-including telecommunications manufacturing, long distance services and infor-
mation content-"can and do function exceedingly well without Regional Company
participation." Western Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. at 6 n.15. According to Judge Greene,
the RBOCs were not needed in the information content business and, in fact, "could
flourish therein only if they used their telecommunication monopolies to disadvan-
tage competitors in these markets." Western Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. at 4.
286. Western Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. at 4 n.9.
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school, structural era, Judge Greene stated that individuals should
not be left "helpless[ ]" before "great aggregations .of capital."287 '
In reversing and remanding Judge Greene's 1988 decision,28 the
Court of Appeals cited a treatise written by Chicago school adher-
ents Areeda and Turner.289 The Court of Appeals stated that re-
taining ,the information content ban would not serve the public
interest, as conceptualized by the antitrust laws, if doing so would
"be certain to lessen competition." 2  Emulating the Chicago
School, the Court of Appeals identified the goal of the antitrust
laws to be competitive efficiency, rather than public interest con-
cerns, such as the protection of ratepayers.2 1 The Court of Ap-
peals further found Judge Greene's solicitude for small, innovative
firms to be misplaced, because protecting such firms might actually
harm competition. 292 . I
The Court of Appeals therefore remanded the case, with instruc-
tions that Judge Greene remove the restiction and permit the
RBOCs to enter the information content market-unless he con-
cluded that the RBOCs' entry into the market would be "certain to
lessen competition." 293 As a result of the appellate court's com-
287. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 163-64 (quoting Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 428 (footnote omit-
ted), and citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50, 55 (1911), and
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323-24 (1897), aff'd sub
nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983)).
288. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283.
289. See Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 308 (citing AREEDA & TURNER, supra note
244, at 1 330, at 141-42).
290. Western Elec. Co., 90 F.2d at 308 (citing AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 244,
at 330, at 141-42).
291. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 296. The Court of Appeals believed that pro-
tecting ratepayers. was the job of the FCC and state regulators, not the district court.
Id.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals stated that the lower court's findings were un-
reliable because they may have been "infected by the court's legal error concerning
the proper standard of review." Id. at 308 (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S.
273, 292 (1982)). Part of Judge Greene's legal error included applying the rigorous
public interest analysis that would be appropriate for reviewing the original consent
to judgment decree, rather than the more lenient standard appropriate for reviewing
modifications made under the. existent decree. Id. at 299-300. This statement re-
sponded to complaints that Judge Greene had "considered the impact of removing
the restrictions on various public policies, including the welfare of local ratepayers,
innovation in the manufacturing market, the goal of universal telephone service, first
amendment values, and the United States' position in international trade." Western
Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 299-300. The Court of Appeals believed that a more rigorous
standard was particularly appropriate for an uncontested modification, as was the
case with the repeal of the information content ban. Id. at 306-07.
292. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 296 (comparing with Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort,
479 U.S. 104, 115 (1986)).
293. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d at 308-09.
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mand, Judge Greene approved the RBOCs' entrance into the in-
formation content field.29
VI. Condusion
Regulations in force now will influence future development of
the information highway. Regulators must, therefore, acknowl-
edge the concepts-such as interactive and noninteractive video
programming transmission, or structural and Chicago school anti-
trust theory-guiding their actions. Also, in this extremely com-
plex and market-sensitive industry, the judiciary should be
especially deferential to the branch of government charged with
assessing facts: Congress.
Much is at stake. A member of the "access-to-the-media" move-
ment in the 1960s wrote at that time:
There is an anomaly in our constitutional law. While we protect
expression once it has come to the fore, our law is indifferent to
creating opportunities for expression. Our constitutional theory
is in the grip of a romantic conception of free expression, a be-
lief that the "marketplace of ideas" is freely accessible.... Dif-
ficulties in securing access, unknown both to the draftsmen of
the first amendment and to the early proponents of its "market-
place" interpretation, have been wrought by the changing tech-
nology of mass media. . . . Only the new media of
communication can lay sentiments before the public, and it is
they rather than the government who can most effectively
abridge expression by nullifying the opportunity for an idea to
win acceptance.295
In the 1990s, we face the same problem in a new guise. Now, the
"new media of communication" is the information highway, which
has incredible potential for engaging more people in the "market-
place of ideas." Individuals will realize this opportunity to place
their own content onto the information highway, rather than
merely receiving the commercialized content of others-but only if
visionary legislatures and judges properly balance First Amend-
294. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. at 309-10.
295. Jerome Barron, Access to the Press: A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1641, 1641 (1967).
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ment and antitrust concerns to ensure that this wonderful new me-
dium is interactive and accessible to the public.29
Laura Land Sigal*
296. The question of access, often phrased as the issue of "universal service," is
important, but beyond the scope of this Note. Interested readers, however, might
start investigating the issue by reading the Notice of Inquiry on Universal Service and
Open Access Issues, which was issued by the NTIA on September 19, 1994. 59 FED.
REG. 48,112 (1994). The FCC is also studying the issue of universal service.
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University. The author thanks James C. Goodale, Esq., Mark S. Nadel, Esq., and the
editorial board of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for their helpful comments on this
Note; and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) for giving her opportunities to learn
firsthand about telecommunications policy.
